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Early in the nineteen eighties the Department of Defense
(DoD) began to react to "bad press" about inflated prices
the military was paying for spare parts. The news media and
the U.S. Congress pummelled DoD and the Military Services
with # a constant barrage of accusations of spare parts
overpricing and mismanagement. The newspaper headlines of
the day ran stories of the Military Services buying "$400
Hammers," "$600 Toilet Seat Covers" and "$7,000 Coffee
Makers." These were the days of the so called "Horror
stories" of spare parts procurement.
The Congress also found this current situation with DoD
and its Military Services a tempting weakness to exploit.
Certain members of Congress supported reductions in the
defense budget, either to reduce the national deficit or to
fund other federal programs, such as socioeconomic programs,
a frequent competitor for defense funds. The defense budget
is an extremely tempting budget for Congress to review
because it is the largest budget funded on a yearly basis.
Also, much of the national budget is already locked in and
there is no decision as to how much to allocate. For
example, the interest payments on the national debt are
essentially mandated and the amount is non-negotiable.
One particular senator decorated a Christmas tree with
items that had been purchased by DoD and that he believed to
be overpriced. Some of these exhibitions were probably just
grandstanding on the part of our public officials involved
but in most cases it was probably an honest concern by our
congressmen that the American taxpayer should be able to get
a fair and reasonable price for the goods and services
purchased by the Government.
When, the spare parts pricing problem came to the
attention of the public it was certainly destructive to the
image of DoD and the various Military Services. Lack of
confidence and lack of support from the general public
certainly translates into lack of support in the Congress.
Lack of support in the Congress will no doubt turn into lack
of support when it comes time to approve appropriations for
the DoD budget.
Why did such things as $400 hammers and $600 toilet seat
covers cause such an uproar with the American press, the
Congress and particularly the American people? The answer
may not be entirely clear but certainly lies within the
realm of lack of confidence in the miliary procurement
establishment and a lack of understanding of Government
procurement. In a masters thesis by LT Stearns [Ref. l:p.
8], it was explained that the general public's
interpretation of the meaning of "spare part" is not the
same for the average American as it is for DoD. He further
indicates that a spare part even has negative connotations
in the mind of the public by suggesting that the word
"spare" suggests something unneeded and extra.
Along with spare parts overpricing problems, the
Military Services were also the brunt of accusations of
colossal cost overruns on the procurement of major weapon
systems. These too made the headlines of the nation's
tabloids and to the halls of Congress. Cost overruns of 100
and 200 percent on multi-million dollar programs staggered
the imagination of the American public. Again, as in the
case of spare parts, the word "overrun," especially when
associated with procurement by the Government simply meant
inefficiency, mismanagement and waste.
A report issued by the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP) on spare parts procurement, and referenced in
a GAO report, sums up the situation as best any one can. It
stated:
Horror stories have created a public perception of a
problem far more common and pervasive than is actually
the case, they do serve as a warning that additional
management attention is needed. [Ref. 2: p. 2]
This situation was further exasperated by audits
conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) and
The Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) . They
charged that the U.S. Military establishment was
experiencing severe problems in the acquisition of spare
parts resulting in overpricing.
On 25 July 1983, then Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger issued a ten point memorandum (see Appendix A) on
how the military departments should proceed in correcting
the spare parts acquisition problem. The first paragraph of
Secretary Weinberger's memorandum clearly indicates, in the
Secretary's opinion, that DoD has not been doing their job
in the acquisition of spare parts and that something needs
to be done now. It stated?
Our recent audits and investigations of aircraft spare
parts accounts demonstrate conclusively that we must
make major changes in the way we order and purchase
spare parts. The directives we instituted in March 1981
to increase competitive bidding and hold down prices
have not been enforced vigorously enough throughout the
Defense Department. [Ref. 3]
Although efforts to reduce the cost of spare parts had
been an ongoing concern since the early 1960 's, this initial
memorandum appears to be the beginning of a whole flurry of
activity with regard to attacking the spare parts pricing
problem in DoD. In August of 1983 several more edicts were
issued including an addendum to the Secretary Weinberger's
memorandum that added twenty-five more initiatives to the
original ten. Also in August, the Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins issued a NAVOP message
dictating actions to be taken by the Navy to correct the
spare parts pricing problem. Earlier in this same month
President Reagan issued a policy statement calling for the
U.S. Government to increase the use of competition in
Federal procurements. Further pressures from a reduced (in
real terms) budget, yet an expanded mission for the Navy has
caused greater calls for more efficient use of the Navy's
resources. The underlying message from all of these
proclamations was that the U.S. Government wanted a fair and
reasonable price for the spare parts it buys. [Ref. 4: pp.
2-5]
B. FOCUS OF RESEARCH
The area of research will focus on the impact of the
Government ' s audit program on the Buy Our Spares Smart
Program. Nearly all U.S. Government organizations undergo
some type of scrutiny of their actions. In most cases this
scrutiny will take the form of an audit, investigation or
inspection. The primary purpose of these audits is to
ensure that the audited agency is in compliance with laws,
directives and regulations. It also is an accounting of
that activity's actions to the people of the United States.
The results of these audits and investigations
frequently result in modifying the goals and objectives of
that activity to conform to the current goals and objectives
of the Government or our society. The researcher will focus
on the changes in the BOSS project as a result of the audits
that have been performed on spare parts management in the
Navy.
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The primary purpose of this study is to consider the
impact of the auditing of various governmental agencies on
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the Navy's Buy Our Spares Smart (BOSS) Program. In
evaluating the impact of the Government's auditing program
on the BOSS project, the researcher will also look at the
consistency of the audits in regard to audit findings and
recommendations, whether audit agency recommendations have
been congruous with the goals and objectives of the Navy and
DoD, and whether the audits have inhibited or fostered the
progress of the BOSS program.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is:
- What impact have the various governmental audit agencies
(U.S. General Accounting Office, Department of Defense
Inspector General and Naval Audit Service) had on the
development of the Navy's Buy Our Spares Smart Program?
Secondary research questions are:
- How do the audit agencies compare regarding audit
findings, discrepancies and recommendations?
- Have the audit agencies recommendations been congruous
with the goals and objectives of the Navy and the
Department of Defense toward procurement?
- Have the audit agencies recommendations furthered Buy
Our Spares Smart Program's progress toward improving
spare parts pricing and to what extent?
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information contained within this study was acquired
from a variety of sources. Initially a review of existing
literature was conducted to gain a basic yet thorough
understanding of the Navy's BOSS Program. The majority of
the background information came from the BOSS Annual
Reports, the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
(DLSIE) and other theses and studies on the BOSS program.
Supplementary information was also obtained from Navy
Instructions, Government directives and articles from
various periodicals.
The primary research information was collected from the
offices of the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) , PML
550. PML 550 provided assistance in obtaining copies of
selected audits from GAO, DoDIG and the Naval Audit Service
and supplementary information related to those audits.
The last source of information was interviews conducted
with various NAVSUP personnel familiar with audits of BOSS
related programs and personnel connected with upholding and
or initiating policy guidance for the BOSS program.
F. SCOPE OF THE STUDY AND LIMITATIONS
The scope of this thesis is concerned with determining
the impact of governmental audits on the BOSS program. The
study is intended to look at those audits that have affected
or had potential to affect the basic goals and objectives of
the BOSS program. It is not the intent of this study to
review every audit or investigation related to the BOSS
program but only those that would or could affect the
policies of the BOSS program. It is also not the intent of
this study to evaluate the effectiveness of the BOSS program
or to provide recommendations as to policy guidance of the
BOSS program. In a nut shell, the intent of this thesis is
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to evaluate the effect auditing has had on the goals,
objectives and policies of the BOSS program.
G. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY
There are three basic assumptions that this researcher
will begin with in order to facilitate the accomplishment of
this thesis. It is assumed that the readers of this thesis
are familiar with standard terminology used within DoD and
the Navy and that the readers of this thesis are familiar
with the basic concepts of procurement within DoD.
Secondly, that current instructions and directives
including the BOSS Annual reports, accurately reflect the
goals, objectives and policies of DoD and the Navy toward
the BOSS program and spare parts procurement. The reason
for this assumption is to ensure a firm baseline when
comparing the activity of goals, objectives and policies
through the years BOSS has been in operation.
Thirdly, it is assumed that the original 112 goals and
objectives accurately reflect the sentiment of the time when
Secretary Weinberger issued his thirty-five initiatives to
combat the problem DoD was having with spare parts
procurement.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I,
of course, is the introductory chapter and provides a brief
overview of the spare parts problem experienced by DoD.
Chapter II is a background chapter and is intended to
provide a historical perspective of the BOSS Program from
its inception in 1983 to the present. Chapter II will also
provide a brief overview of the auditing agencies and also
the agencies that were audited.
Chapter III presents the information that was gathered
from PML 550 and briefly summarizes each of the audits
examined. In addition to examining audits, Chapter III will
also review each of the initiative categories and briefly
describe the activity each has had since the inception of
BOSS in 1983. Chapter IV is the analysis of the information
presented in Chapter III. Chapter IV will relate goal and
objective changes, if any, to the recommendations and
findings presented in the selected audits. Finally, Chapter
V provides the conclusions and recommendations of this
thesis toward the impact of audits on the BOSS program.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
With the introduction of Secretary of Defense
Weinberger's ten-point plan of 25 July 1983, each Service
and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) was directed to take
action to remedy "the way we (DoD) order and purchase spare
parts." Each Service and DLA initiated programs in response
to the Secretary's memorandum. The programs had many
similarities, such as increased competition and breakout,
but there were differences. [Ref. 2: p. 21]
The Army's plan, Spare Parts Review Initiatives,
consisted of sixty-four initiatives covering a wide range of
spare parts related subjects such as: personnel, pricing,
competition and automation. The Army's spare parts
improvement initiatives are monitored by the Director of the
Procurement and Production Directorate, Army Material
Command. [Ref. 2: pp. 21-2 2]
The Air Force was recognized as a leader in attacking
the problems that plagued spare parts acquisition according
to a GAO report on DoD's initiatives to improve spare parts
acquisition. The Air Force formed an analysis group, drawn
from major Air Force Commands, Air Staff, General Counsel,
DLA, and the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, to
look at the spare parts pricing problem and presented a
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report in October of 1983. The Air Force Management
Analysis Group, as the forum was called, presented 178
initiatives to improve the Air Force's procurement of spare
parts. The Air Force monitors the progress of these
initiatives by a board of general officers that meet each
month and reports to the Secretary of the Air Force. [Ref.
2:p. 22]
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) implemented its spare
parts improvement initiative throughout its organization and
is monitored by its Competition Advocacy Program. DLA
managers visited contractors serving DLA with the goal of
obtaining technical data to increase the number of
competitive buys. DLA also implemented a number of changes
to help buyers, such as, increasing staffs, implementing
breakout programs, and improving data storage and retrieval
required to process a buy. [Ref. 2:pp. 23-24]
The Services and DLA were not the only Defense
activities tasked to tackle the spare parts procurement
problem in DoD. Several DoD officials were assigned
specific tasks by the Secretary of Defense.
Secretary Weinberger ordered the DoD Inspector General
to:
- notify the secretaries of the departments and the
Director, DLA, of unreasonable pricing so refunds are
sought in all cases where appropriate;
- audit, with the Defense Contract Audit Agency's
assistance, defective pricing at contractor plants where
spare parts pricing had been found unreasonable; and;
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- work with the secretaries and the Director, DLA, to set
implementation dates for the corrective action and to
schedule follow-up audits. [Ref. 2:p. 24]
The Deputy Secretary of Defense was instructed to
monitor the progress of DoD spare parts acquisition
improvement initiatives. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
held quarterly meetings with the departments concerned in
which the status of the initiatives • implementation was
reviewed.
Lastly, the Secretary of Defense named a Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Spare Parts Program
Management to:
- organize and improve consistency among initiatives
already undertaken,
- define areas to which additional attention should be
dedicated, and
- develop a strategy to ensure continuing focus on
critical aspects of the spare parts management reform.
[Ref. 2:p. 25]
B. THE BUY OUR SPARES SMART PROGRAM
The Navy's response to Secretary Weinberger's Spare
Parts Procurement Memorandum was the Buy Our Spares Smart
(BOSS) project. On 1 September 1983, the Chief of Naval
Material (NAVMAT) , Admiral Steven A. White, USN, announced
the Navy's program to tackle the problem of spare parts
pricing. Project BOSS was specifically created to "monitor
and coordinate" actions that would address the problems and
system weaknesses in the material acquisition process. The
primary objective of the BOSS project was to pay fair and
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reasonable prices for spare parts yet maintain the highest
possible state of readiness in the fleet. [Ref. 4:pp. 2-5]
The theme of the project was to ensure that supply system
assets were properly utilized while concurrently reducing
the cost of those parts to be purchased. [Ref. l:p. 27]
The early beginnings of BOSS saw the drafting of some
112 initiatives (Appendix B) designed to improve the
acquisition of spare parts used by the Navy. The
initiatives primarily focused the efforts of the BOSS
program to implement Secretary Weinberger's 10-point plan
for improvement of spare parts procurement in DoD. In many
cases, the initiatives addressed problems that were
identified in recent audits of the Navy's material
procurement system. The BOSS initiatives were also
consciously written to reflect policy guidance from
Congress, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and NAVMAT.
It was believed that translation of these policy statements
would enhance the ability of the BOSS program to obtain its
goals. [Ref. 4:pp. 2-5]
With the establishment of the BOSS program under the
direction of the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) PML-
550 (BOSS project office) began the job of changing the way
the Navy acquires spare parts. The BOSS program was founded
on three principles, or cornerstones, as referred to by the
BOSS annual reports. These cornerstones are: competition,
breakout, and fair and reasonable prices. [Ref. 5:p. 1]
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1. Competition
Competition is the prime element of the BOSS
program. Its primary purpose is to promote greater
attention on the part of industry, procure goods and
services for the Government at fair and reasonable prices,
and to cause contracting activities to pursue successful
competitive procurements. Successful procurements are those
that are of reasonable cost, of high quality and delivered
on time. [Ref. 5: p. i]
Competition is something in which every Navy
activity can participate. Under the BOSS program all
purchasing activities were required to adhere to BOSS
guidance. Those activities having procurement authority in
excess of $25,000 and or customer activities having annual
procurements greater than $1 million were required to
establish Competition Advocates. Competition Advocates were
senior civilian or military personnel, as the title
suggests, charged with seeking out and implementing ways to
increase competition. For instance, Competition Advocates
reviewed sole source procurements to ensure that the
conditions had been met for a non-competitive acquisition.
They were also tasked to pursue ways to eliminate barriers
to competitive procurements and reduce dependence on sole
source acquisitions. The Navy has Competition Advocates at
more than 2 00 procurement activities.
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Other actions that BOSS has pursued to increase
competition is to provide more and improved information to
potential Navy contractors and to ensure more contractors
are aware of that information. The Navy also implemented a
major program to automate the procurement system called the
Automation of Procurement and Data Entry (APADE) System.
APADE is a decision support system designed to enable buyers
to obtain source and price history information. This system
will allow buyers to make repetitive buys with greater ease
and help to ensure that the most competitive price is paid.
[Ref. l:pp. 56-59]
2 . Breakout
Breakout is one of the tools that the Navy can use
to kindle the fires of competition. Breakout is a method
used to reduce the cost of spare parts by either acquiring
the spares directly from the original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) or identifying parts (through value analysis) that can
be competed rather than procured from the prime contractor
or a sole source provider. The objective is to eliminate
the middleman or pass-through costs added to a part.
Research has shown that a spare part may experience a cost
increase of 250% without any added value when purchased from
a prime contractor or sole source supplier. In accordance
with the BOSS annual report for 1987 the Navy can expect to
reap a cost reduction of 2 5 to 3 3 percent on a successful
breakout. [Ref. 6:p. 8]
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All centrally managed parts in DoD have an
Acquisition Management Code (AMC) assigned. The AMC is used
to determine how an item should be procured. Technical
personnel at Service and DLA activities screen parts and
make AMC assignments. AMC's provide the buyer or
contracting officer information about the acquisition method
and sources from which the part may be acquired. AMCs (1
through 5) are defined as follows:
- AMCs 1 and 2 indicate that a spare part can be
competed (2 is used if competed for the first time)
.
- AMCs 3 and 4 indicate that the spare part can be
acquired directly from the actual manufacturer who may
be the prime contractor (4 is used if the spare part
is designated for the first time)
.
- AMC 5 indicates the spare part can be acquired only
from the prime contractor even if the technical data
indicates the part comes from a source other than the
prime contractor. [Ref. 7: p. 2]
Breakout is considered to have occurred when a spare
part previously coded AMC 5 is screened and then is either
purchased through competition (AMCs 1 and 2) or purchased
from the original manufacturer (AMC 3 and 4) . A purchase
action through competition is the preferred method of the
two.
The Breakout program involves two basic processes:
full screen and limited screen reviews. Full screen reviews
can be performed on any replenishment part and is ideally
accomplished well in advance of a planned procurement. A
full screen review is a very detailed and in-depth data
evaluation of replenishment spare parts with a specified
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Annual Buy Value (ABV) of $10,000 or more. The Defense
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DARSUP) No. 6 calls for a
65 step process which includes, but not limited to,
technical data review, locating missing data, and economic
analysis. Full screen reviews are performed on parts that
are expected to be purchased within the next twelve months
and meet the above criteria. Full reviews are initiated at
the Inventory Control Point (ICP) and breakout decisions are
either approved at the ICP, the In-service Engineering
Activity (ISEA) or the appropriate Hardware Systems Command.
[Ref. 8:p. 3]
Limited screen reviews are applied to items already
in the procurement cycle. In limited screen reviews only
the essential elements of the technical data are evaluated.
Limited screen reviews normally involve unsophisticated
material that is not complex in nature. Limited screen
reviews can be performed by any procurement activity with
sufficient resources and the breakout decision is also made
at that level. [Ref. 8: p. 3]
Other areas that have contributed to the Breakout
process are Value Engineering, challenging proprietary data
rights, and Reverse Engineering. Value Engineering is a
systematic effort directed at analyzing functional
requirements for the purpose of achieving lowest total cost,
consistent with needed performance, reliability, quality,
and maintainability. The overall objective of Value
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Engineering is to identify and reduce unnecessary costs.
Value Engineering is required on all spare parts contracts
greater than $25,000 [Ref. 9] and is required on all
supplies and services contracts greater than $100,000.
[Ref. 10]
An important aspect of Breakout is the evaluation of
technical data. Missing or inadequate technical data can
severely handicap the Breakout process. This situation can
be lessened by challenging the contractor's proprietary
data, and ensuring that clauses are contained within the
contract that provide for the procurement of technical data.
Reverse Engineering, as the name implies, is a
method of working backwards by taking a product and
producing technical specifications. This method is used
when an item is sole source, technical data is not
available, and the ABV of the item is high. The technical
data is then used in the reprocurement of the item.
3 . Fair and Reasonable Prices
The BOSS program recognizes two major approaches to
ensure that the Navy pays only fair and reasonable prices
for spare parts. The Fiscal Year (FY) 1987 BOSS Annual
Report describes these approaches as follows:
The front-end approach uses the PRICE FIGHTER Detachment's
capability to perform a SHOULD COST analysis and the BUYER
TECH LINE. The back-fit approach is the Navy's Pricing
Hotline, which provides an avenue for Navy personnel to
report suspected overpriced items. [Ref. 5:p. 19]
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Price Fighter is a group of engineers, industrial
engineering technicians, and equipment specialists who
perform Should Cost analyses on spare parts. The group is
located at NSC Norfolk, VA. and performs detailed technical
and pricing reviews to determine what a spare part "Should
Cost" the Navy. The information provided by the group is
used by buyers to acquire better prices from the supplier.
Price Fighter also prepares recommendations for changes in
specifications to eliminate unnecessary requirements, thus
reducing the cost. [Ref. 5: pp. 19-21]
Other programs associated with the Price Fighter
effort are the Buyer Tech-Line and "Bad Apple" programs.
Both programs were added after the initial implementation of
the BOSS project. The Buyer Tech-Line program is operated
out of the Price Fighter Detachment in Norfolk and provides
technical information to the entire Navy Field Contracting
System (NFCS) to support intelligent, cost effective spares
purchase. [Ref. 5:p. 19]
The "Bad Apple" program initiated in FY 1987, was
designed to identify potentially overpriced items by their
association with similar or associated items that had
already been identified as being overpriced. For example,
similar or associated items are those that are in the same
weapon systems or manufactured by the same contractor. A
Should Cost analysis is perform on the selected item to
determine whether the price is fair and reasonable. [Ref.
5:p. 21]
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The second of the two approaches in obtaining fair
and reasonable prices is the Navy's Pricing Hotline. The
Pricing Hotline is operated out of the Fleet Material
Support Office (FMSO) and is the single point of contact for
all pricing inquiries in the Navy. The Hotline investigates
reports of overpricing it receives from the fleet, shore
activities, and other service commands. The Hotline refers
these reports to the procuring activity for analysis and the
results are reported back to FMSO. The theme of this
program is that; "No one is in a better position to know the
purpose and the intrinsic value of spare parts and equipment
than the technicians who use them." [Ref. 8: p. 5]
C. THE AUDIT AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES AUDITED
Three agencies performed the selected audits of the BOSS
program: the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) , the
Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) , and the
Naval Audit Service. Each of these agencies have played a
major part in the auditing and evaluation of the BOSS
program.
The GAO and the Bureau of Budget 1 were created by the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. GAO ' s mission was a
continuation of a mission given the Treasury Department by
•^The Bureau of Budget (BoB) was the predecessor of the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) which was established
by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. BoB was an
executive agency whose principal mission was to support
agencies directly responsible to the President of the United
States.
20
the First Congress of the Republic in 1789. That mission
was to ensure that the financial transactions of the United
States Government were proper, accurate, and legal. GAO was
established "primarily" as a congressional agency and was
given independent powers for which it only accounts to the
"deity." However GAO is dependent upon the Congress for its
resources, powers, and responsibilities and upon the
Presidency for the appointment of its agency head and first
assistant, the Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller
General. [Ref. 11: pp. 1-2]
The scope of GAO ' s responsibilities has grown
tremendously in the years since it was first established as
a watchdog of the Government's financial transactions. GAO
now has responsibility for the evaluation and investigation
all aspects of the Government. The responsibilities extend
into both military and civilian sectors and include not only
financial transaction but program analysis. GAO has virtual
authority to look at any sector of the Government and in
some cases even the private sector (e.g., GAO has authority
to review contractor's private records incident to
negotiated Government contracts)
.
The DoD Office of the Inspector General (DoDIG) is the
principal audit agency of DoD. DoDIG is headed up by a
civilian appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. DoDIG is staffed by both civilian, and military
personnel assigned to joint duty within DoDIG. The mission
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of DoDIG is quoted directly from the directive that
established the position of Inspector General and the Office
of the Inspector General:
As an independent and objective office in the Department
of Defense, the Office of the Inspector General shall:
- Conduct, supervise, monitor, and initiate audits and
investigations relating to programs and operations
of the Department of Defense.
- Provide leadership and coordination and recommend
policies for activities designed to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration
of, and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such
programs and operations.
- Provide a means for keeping the Secretary of Defense
and the Congress fully and currently informed about
problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operations and the
necessity for and progress of corrective action.
[Ref. 12:p. 1]
The Inspector General for DoD carries out his
responsibilities under the general supervision of the
Secretary of Defense, but can not be inhibited in any audit
or investigation unless the audit or investigation would
affect information concerning sensitive operational plans,
intelligence matters, on-going criminal investigations
within DoD, and matters of national security. DoDIG can
initiate audits or investigations independently or at the
request of the Secretary. [Ref 12: pp. 2-3]
The Naval Audit Service is the central internal audit
organization within the Department of the Navy (DoN) . The
Office of the Auditor General is responsible to the Under
Secretary of the Navy and is charged with developing and
22
implementing DoN internal audit policies, programs, and
procedures. The mission of the Naval Audit Service is to
perform internal audits of DoN activities, functions, and
programs and to issue reports on these audits describing
conditions found, and recommendations for corrective
actions. [Ref. 13]
The Naval Audit Service is partitioned into four
regional offices and a headquarters office. The Naval Audit
Service is an independent staff function and the sole entity
or office within DoN designated to conduct the Internal
Control function. Audits are performed at the initiation of
the Auditor General of the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy,
or upon command request.
The Naval activities audited by the agencies described
above were all involved with spare parts management. For
the purposes of this thesis, these activities have been
grouped into seven categories by the researcher. The
groupings were as follows:
- The Naval Aviation Supply Office (ASO) . ASO is the
inventory control point (ICP) for aircraft, missile, and
related equipment spare parts.
- The Navy Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) . SPCC is the
ICP for Navy ships, ship's weapon systems, and related
equipment spare parts.
- Headquarters (HQ) and Systems Commands (SYSCOMS) . HQ is
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps (CMC) . SYSCOMS are the Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIR) , Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA)
,




- Naval Supply Centers (NSC) and Naval Aviation Depots
(NADEP) . The NSCs are intermediate supply activities
serving fleet and shore units of the Navy and to some
extent the other Services. The NADEPs, formally the
Naval Air Rework Facilities (NARF) , are overhaul depots
for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. These activities
were combined into one category due to the close
relationship they have in the management of aircraft
parts
.
- Other Navy Activities. This is a catch all category for
all other Navy and Marine Corps activities that were
involved in selected audits concerning the BOSS program
but did not meet the criteria for activities described
in items 1 through 4. Examples in this category would
be the Fleet Commanders, Naval Air Stations, and Marine
Corps Bases.
- Other Military Services and the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) . DLA is wholesale supply activity serving all DoD
components and departments.
- Service Plant Representative Offices (SERVPRO) and
Defense Contractors. SERVPROs (e.g., NAVPRO and AFPRO)
are offices operated by a designated service and located
within a contractors plant for the purpose of
administering Government contracts.
Although ASO and SPCC are both ICPs for the Navy they
were categorized separately because of their individual
impacts and contributions to the BOSS program. Similarly
many activities with dissimilar backgrounds were grouped
together because of the close relationship that exists
between them with regard to spare parts management. Along
this same line, some major commands were not mentioned due
to their limited impact upon the BOSS program. For example,
the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) was not
mentioned in the HQ and SYSCOMS category.
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D. SUMMARY
In response the Secretary of Defense's memorandum and
congressional pressure each Service and DLA developed an
independent program to deal with the spare parts pricing
within their respective departments. The programs had many
similarities, such as increasing competition and breakout,
but there were differences. The Navy's response to this
situation was the establishment of the BOSS program in
September of 1983. The BOSS program was based upon three
principles: competition, breakout, and fair and reasonable
prices.
To evaluate the programs and to determine the progress
made in resolving the spare parts pricing problem, three
activities were tasked to audit and investigate the Services
and DLA's spare parts improvement programs. These
activities are: GAO, DoDIG, and the Naval Audit Service.
For the purposes of this paper the activities audited
were grouped into six categories: ASO, SPCC, HQ and
SYSCOMS, NSCs/NSDs and NADEPs, other Navy activities, and
other Services and DLA.
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III. PRESENTATION OF THE INFORMATION
A. STATUS OF THE BOSS INITIATIVES
When the BOSS program was established in 1983 some 112
initiatives were drafted to improve Navy spare parts
acquisition practices. Since that time 15 additional
initiatives have been added for a total of 127. Each of the
BOSS initiatives can be directly related to one or more of
former Secretary of Defense Weinberger's original ten
initiatives. Of the 127 initiatives, 108 have been
completed, 13 remain open, five have been cancelled, and one
is continuing as of 31 March 1988.
The BOSS initiatives have been arranged into ten
categories representing the various action elements of the
BOSS program. Although there are ten initiative categories
they do not directly correspond to initiatives in the
Secretary's ten-point plan. The 127 initiatives are broken
out as follows: Requirements Determination, Breakout,
Competition, Method of Procurement, Pricing, Price
Surveillance, Contract Management, Training, Automated
Systems, and Resources. Each of the different categories
has a number of initiatives assigned to it and each
initiative is assigned a specific code, such as RD-1 (i.e.,
Requirement Determination initiative number 1) and P-5
(Pricing initiative number 5) . This was done to facilitate
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the tracking and monitoring of the total 127 initiatives.
The initiatives and their current status can be reviewed in
Appendix B.
1. Requirements Determination (RD)
This category is primarily concerned with policy
relating to the use of supply system assets during every
phase of the weapon system's life cycle. This is to ensure
that adequate direction exists in determining when to use
standard material (i.e., supply system material) or
contractor furnished material. This category is also
concerned with economic order quantities (EOQ) and the
provisioning process. Examples of initiatives in this
category are: review policy concerning the use of common-
use items in contractor maintenance/supply packages,
research EOQ rules to determine their effectiveness, and
review repair verses buy decisions.
The Requirements Determination category has nine
initiatives of which five have been completed, one
cancelled, and three are outstanding. Since implementation
of the BOSS program only one additional initiative has been
added; RD-9, compete spares buys for initially competed
equipment (Aug 86). RD-1, RD-7 , and RD-9 are the




The topic of Breakout was discussed previously in
Chapter II, and as subsequently stated, Breakout is
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concerned with acquiring spare parts directly from the
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) rather than the prime
or sole source contractor. This category was primarily
concerned with implementing procedures to increase the use
of Breakout in spare parts procurement. Examples of
Breakout initiatives are: make Breakout a factor in source
selection of major systems; have contractors certify whether
they manufactured, bought, assembled, or tested an item to
be sold to the Government; and develop policy defining
requirements for obtaining technical data for level II/III
drawings.
The Breakout category contains 34 initiatives, of
which 26 have been completed, two have been cancelled, and
six are outstanding. B-10, B-ll, B-13, B-21, B-23, and B-32
are Breakout initiatives still outstanding. Breakout has
resulted in six new initiatives since the BOSS program has
been started:
- Develop a supply policy to govern agreements when vendor
purchases or borrows parts for design replication (B-
29/Jan 85)
.
- Develop a plan to eliminate unnecessary contract
specifications (B-30/Jan 85)
.
- Implement a Reverse Engineering program (B-31/Apr 85)
.
- Define policy for application of warranties to secondary
items (B-32/Jul 85)
.
- Expand the ICPs' repair base (B-32/Dec 85).
- Propose a change to MILSTD 129 to include marking
packages with manufacturer's FSCM/part number (B-3 4/Aug




The primary purpose of this category is to promote
increased competition in spare parts procurement. This
category probably affects procurement activities more than
any other since competition is a major cornerstone in the
BOSS program. Examples of Competition initiatives are:
establish competition goals for major field procurement
activities, appoint Competition Advocates at activities with
$25,000 authority and establish a Competition Advocated
award, and establish procedures to review acquisition plans
and business clearances for an adequate spare parts annex.
This category has 17 initiatives, of which 16 have
been completed and one has been cancelled; all Competition
initiatives have been executed. Since the implementation of
the BOSS program the Competition category has added three
new initiatives. These are: C-14, COMNAVSUP to meet with
major suppliers to address spare parts pricing (Aug 85) ; C-
15, ICPs are to prepare Competition Advocate pamphlets (Feb
86); and C-16, Define and establish "model business
relationships" with major weapon systems manufacturers (Jul
85) . The last initiative was later cancelled because it
became obsolete before execution (OBE) . [Ref. 14]
4 Method of Procurement (MP)
The primary purpose of this category is to
investigate alternative methods of procurement. Most
alternative methods are already available, but have not been
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fully implemented to the maximum extent possible. A major
goal is to expand the coordination of spare parts
procurement with the production of major systems for both
Government and foreign military sales (FMS) customers.
Examples of Method of Procurement initiatives are: continue
actions under the Spares Acquisition Integrated with
Production (SAIP) program and expand the use of multi-year
contracts «,
There are six MP initiatives and all six have been
completed. There have not been any additional initiatives
in this category since the implementation of the BOSS
program. [Ref. 14]
5« Pricing (P)
This category is concerned with pricing techniques
and methods to avoid overpricing. The emphasis, as well as
one of BOSS'S primary goals, is to obtain fair and
reasonable prices for spare parts. Examples of Pricing
initiatives are: request the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA) to perform audits of contractor's pricing techniques,
analyze prices of locally purchased material, and identify
and attack instances where Navy is paying interdivisional
mark-up on spare parts.
This category contains 14 initiatives of which 13
have been completed and one (P-9) is still being worked.
Since the implementation of the BOSS program two new
initiatives have been added: P-13, increase the awareness
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of the Price Fighter mission (Sep 85); and P-14, conduct a





The primary emphasis of the Price Surveillance
initiatives is to detect spare parts overpricing. Pricing
and Price Surveillance initiatives are very similar. The
principal difference lies with Price Surveillance being
involved with detection of overpricing, while Pricing is
concerned with the prevention of overpricing. Examples of
Price Surveillance initiatives are: develop NAVSUP's
capability to perform Should Cost analysis, direct field
activities to identify potential overpricing, and develop
criteria for evaluating the Price Fighter program.
There are 20 Price Surveillance initiatives, of
which 19 have been completed and one cancelled; there are no
outstanding initiatives in this category. Since the
implementation of the BOSS program two new initiatives have
been added: PS-19, determine if National Industries for the
Blind/Federal Prison Industries prices should be challenged;
and PS-20, conduct a three month pilot Price Fighter Tech-




This initiative is concerned with in the impact of
contracts and contract management on spare parts pricing.
The type of contract and its provisions have a major effect
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on the price the Government pays for spare parts. Examples
of contract management initiatives are: utilize Value
Engineering incentive clauses to comply with DoD directives,
and accept refunds from contractors who have overcharged.
There are seven initiatives in this category, of
which six have been completed, with one (CM-7) outstanding.
Since the implementation of the BOSS program the Contract
Management category has experienced only one addition; CM-7,




This category recognized the weaknesses of
procurement training for buyers and sought to remedy the
situation. Much greater emphasis has been placed on
ensuring that the procurement work force is well trained and
motivated. Examples of training initiatives are: review
training/qualification criteria for the 1102 and 1105
series, and review requirements for contracting officer
warrants
.
There are five initiatives in this category and all
five have been completed. There have not been any Training
initiatives added since the implementation of the BOSS
program. [Ref. 14]
9. Automated Systems (AS)
These initiatives recognize the lack of automation
in the procurement community. The Automated Systems
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initiatives are concerned with increasing the automation of
the administrative processes at ICPs, stock points, and
Naval Regional Contracting Centers (NRCC) . Examples of
Automated Systems initiatives are: increase automation of
the procurement process, and automate Navy technical data
repositories.
There are six initiatives in this category, of which
two have been completed and four (AS-1, AS-2, AS-4, AS-5)
are outstanding. No new initiatives were added to the
Automated Systems category since implementation of BOSS.
[Ref. 14]
10. Resources (R)
This category is concerned with the allocation of
resources for the BOSS program. It was realized early in
the program that resources would have to be exclusively
dedicated to make it work effectively. Examples of
Resources initiatives are: increase resources to enhance
competition and pricing at NAVSUP procurement activities,
and implement a system to track the costs/savings of the
BOSS program.
There are nine initiatives in the resources
category and all have been completed. There have not been
any additional initiatives added since the beginning of the
BOSS program. [Ref. 14]
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B. HOW FAR HAS BOSS COME?
Fiscal year 1987 was hailed as a banner year for the
BOSS project. This was due to BOSS exceeding its
competition and breakout goals, and realizing a total cost
avoidance beyond expectation. This perspective is bore out
in Rear Admiral Walker's, Commander of the Naval Supply
Systems Command, comments on the program in the FY 1987 BOSS
Annual Report. The first two paragraphs are quoted as
follows:
- Fiscal Year 1987 was another outstanding year for the
BOSS project. We have made major progress on all fronts
in our efforts to improve the acquisition and management
of spare parts. The Navy exceeded both competition and
breakout goals set for the fiscal year, and realized a
total cost avoidance beyond expectations. The
cumulative cost avoidance for BOSS has now reached $1.3
billion2 .
- During Fiscal Year 1987, the Navy awarded $27.3 billion
in competitive contracts, which represents achievement
of a 55.3 percent competition rate. We achieved our
steady state level of 2 3,000 annual breakout reviews, as
projected when Project BOSS began in August 1983. The
cost avoidance attributable to the breakout effort
totals $189.6 million. The Navy Pricing Hotline
received a record high of 10,006 price challenges during
the fiscal year. And, last but not least, the Navy's
PRICE FIGHTER Detachment racked up $31.6 million in cost
avoidance, up from $6.9 million in FY 86, through
various uses of their SHOULD COST analyses. [Ref. 5:p.
i]
In reality this narrative has been typical for the BOSS
Program. BOSS has had tremendous success in meeting its
goals since it was started in 1983. It is important to
2This figure represents total cost avoidance since the
implementation of the BOSS project in 1983.
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examine the progress of the BOSS program since its
inception. To facilitate this review this thesis will look
at the progress of BOSS in terms of each of its three
prevailing goals: competition, breakout, and fair and
reasonable prices.
The emphasis on competition in Navy procurement has been
pursued with intense vigor. This has been particularly true
for those procurements involving spare parts purchase. The
goal for FY 1987 was to compete 62 percent of NAVSUP's
procurement dollars. The actual competition rate (NAVSUP)
was 69.4 percent, exceeding the planned goal by 7.2
percentage points. In general the BOSS program has shown a
steady increase in competition (measured in dollars) . This
trend can be easily observed for the Navy Field Contracting
System (NFCS) in Figure 1. The same type of growth,
although not as impressive in terms competition rate (i.e,
42% vs. 82.8% dollars competed), can also be seen at the
Navy's' ICPs (Figure 2). [Ref. 5:pp. 3-9]
The Breakout program has been and continues to be the
most successful program within the BOSS project for
achieving cost savings. FY 1987 saw a cost avoidance of
$189.6 million, or 46% of the total cost avoidance realized
by the BOSS program. During FY 1987 BOSS also passed its
steady state goal of 23,000 annual breakout reviews;
completing 23,026. In Fy 1986 17,265 breakout reviews were
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Figure 1 Navy Field Contracting System Competitive Dollars
(Less Inventory Control Points)
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Figure 2 Combined Inventory Control Point
Competitive Statistics
Source: FY87 BOSS Annual Report
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million, or 56% of total BOSS savings. In FY 1985 10,711
items were reviewed in which $192.7 million in cost
avoidance was achieved, or 58% of BOSS'S total savings. FY
1984 saw the screening of 5,189 items in which $154.8
million, or 80% of the total cost saving achieved by BOSS.
[Ref. 5:pp. 9-19]
As can be seen from the information presented above,
Breakout has been steadily increasing in the number of
breakout reviews. However, the relative savings have
consistently decreased as a "percent" of the total cost
avoidance of BOSS. This seems to be a reasonable trend
considering that breakout reviews were originally targeted
on high value items, and as the program continues, items
eligible for Breakout will decrease. This researcher
anticipates that FY 1988 statistics for Breakout will be
considerably less than the FY 1987 now that the steady
state level of 23,000 annual breakout reviews has been
reached. Figure 3 shows the trends in the Breakout program
since its beginning.
As described in Chapter II, the Navy uses two major
approaches to ensure that only fair and reasonable prices
are paid for spare parts—the Price Fighter Detachment and
the Buyer Tech-Line. Both programs have been successful for
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Figure 3 Full Screen Breakout Results
Source: FY87 BOSS Annual Report
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Price Fighter's fundamental tool for ensuring that the
Navy pays only fair and reasonable prices for spare parts is
Should Cost analysis. In FY 1987 Price Fighter performed
Should Cost analysis 3 on 4,441 items for a total of $31.6
million in cost savings attributable to the program. In FY
1986 the program performed Should Cost analysis on 2,923
items for a total cost savings of $8.9 million. In FY 1985
2,527 items were analyzed by Should Cost methods resulting a
$2.2 million cost savings. On average the Price Fighter
Should Cost analysis determined that 67 percent of the items
reviewed had been overpriced. Figure 3 shows a graphical
representation of Price Fighter progress. [Ref. 5:p. 19]
The Navy Pricing Hotline, the single point of contact
for all pricing inquires in the Navy, has also experienced
substantial growth since its implementation. In FY 1987 the
Pricing Hotline received over 10,000 inquiries on items
suspected of being overpriced. To date, price decreases
have been realized on about 22.8 percent of the total
inquires received since the Hotline's inception in 1983.
The Navy has also received over $1 million in refunds
from contractors who had been identified as selling
overpriced parts to the Navy. Figure 4 presents a graphical
^Should Cost analysis is a concept of evaluation
employing procurement, contract administration, audit, and
engineering representatives to conduct an in-depth cost
analysis. The goal is to develop a realistic price
objective to enable buyers to negotiate better prices with























Figure 4 "Price Fighter Should Cost" Analyses Results
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illustration of the Pricing Hotline's growth. [Ref. 5: p.
25]
As with all programs in the Government resources are
necessary to do the job. The BOSS program has enjoyed a
continued increase in funding since its beginning. This
fact is probably attributable to its ever increasing cost
avoidance statistics. However, it should be noted that the
cost avoidance, although increasing, is increasing at a
decreasing rate. Table I shows BOSS'S funding profile and
the cost savings it has incurred.
C. BUY OUR SPARES SMART AUDITS
When Secretary of Defense Weinberger issued his
memorandum in 198 3 declaring war on overpriced spare parts,
he issued ten specific objectives or initiatives for DoD to
implement. The ninth initiative in that memorandum called
for continuation of audits and investigations. The
following is a quote of the ninth initiative.
Ninth , our audits and investigations of spare parts will
continue. In addition to the eight audits the Inspector
General has already issued, Service auditors have issued
some 25 others. The Inspector General has six additional
audits in progress, and will begin three others in the
next few months. These will focus on the broader
ramifications of how we buy our spare parts, what we pay
for them, and how they are used and controlled once they
enter the inventory. In addition to investigating
aircraft engine spare parts, we will now look at cost
growth in electronic spares and contract administration
activities. [Ref. 3]
All Services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
underwent numerous audits of their programs involved with
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the elimination of spare parts overpricing problems. Most
of the audits were designed to measure the effectiveness of
these programs and their compliance with the Secretary's
initiatives. GAO and DoDIG were generally tasked with
auditing DoD as a whole and the various Service auditing
TABLE I
BOSS FUNDING
(In Millions of Dollars)
FY84 FY85 FYS 6 FY87
NAVAIR 7.2 12.8 20.4 29.4
NAVSEA 6.8 17.5 26.2 39.8
SPAWAR 2.5 4.4 5.7 7.7
NAVSUP 18.6 31.2 34.4 50.2
FLEETS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
TOTAL 35.1 65.9 86.7 127.8
SUMMARY OF BOSS COST AVOIDANCE






























































Source: FY 1987 BOSS Annual Report
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agencies (e.g., Naval Audit Service) concerned themselves
with Service specific audits. The Naval Audit Service is
the Navy's auditing agency responsible for the conduct of
audits and investigations of the Navy, and the Marine Corps.
It was common practice for the various Service auditing
agencies to assist in audits conducted under the
supervision of DoDIG.
Since the implementation of the BOSS project, annual
reports have listed 16 audits that have been completed. The
FY 1987 BOSS annual report also lists nine other audits in
progress at the end that year. Four of these audits had
been completed and draft reports are available. It was
these 2 completed audits that were selected for examination
in determining the impact of agency audits on the BOSS
program. [Refs. 5, 16, 17, 18]
Although there have been several other audits of the
BOSS program they were not examined4 . An interview with
Commander Frank Keller, SC, USN, BOSS Project Director,
stated that the audits listed in the BOSS annual reports
were the most important since they were/are actively
followed by the BOSS project office, and of highest interest
to the upper echelons of NAVSUP. [Ref. 19] Appendix C is
an index of the selected audits that were examined in this
thesis.
4Most of these audits would have been of field
activities like local purchasing offices to ensure their
compliance with directives, and regulations. The results of
these audits would not have a significant affect on BOSS
policy.
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D. GOVERNMENT AUDITS AND THE BOSS PROGRAM
A fundamental premise of the U.S. Government is the
accountability of its actions to the people it serves. One
of the methods the Government uses to evaluate its
performance are audits. Forty-five years ago Government
auditors concentrated on the financial accuracy of
Government bookkeeping. In recent years the auditing
agencies in the Government have expanded the scope to
include reviews of the efficiency and effectiveness of
Government operations.
In 1972 the Comptroller General of the United States
(GAO) issued Standards for Audit of Government
Organizations. Programs. Activities and Functions (also
known as the "yellow book") , a publication designed to
standardize audit procedures for Government entities. These
standards have gained wide acceptance by all governmental
agencies and Federal legislation requires that all Inspector
Generals follow them. [Ref. 20 sp. i]
All audits examined under this thesis were performed in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing
standards. Generally accepted Government auditing standards
and auditing procedures are outlined within the yellow book
which specifies three types or categories of audits for
Government activities. For the purposes of this thesis the
reader should have a basic understanding of the types of
audits that are specified. The following is an excerpt from
the yellow book describing the three audit types.
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- Financial and compliance—determines (a) whether the
financial statements of an audited entity present fairly
the financial position and the results of financial
operations in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles and (b) whether the entity has
complied with laws and regulations that may have a
material effect upon the financial statements.
- Economy and efficiency—determines (a) whether the
entity is managing and utilizing its resources (such as
personnel, property, space) economically and
efficiently, (b) the causes of inefficiencies or
uneconomical practices, and (c) whether the entity has
complied with laws and regulation concerning matters of
economy and efficiency.
- Program results—determines (a) whether the desired
results or benefits established by the legislature or
other authorizing body are being achieved and (b)
whether the agency has considered alternatives that
might yield desired results at a lower cost. [Ref.
20:p. 3]
An audit conducted on Government agencies can include
one, two or all three of these audits. In most cases a
single audit will contain one or at most two of the audit
types. Audits conducted on the BOSS program were restrained
to Economy and Efficiency, and/or Program Results. All
selected audits were classified in the Economy and
Efficiency category, one third of the audits (7 of 20) were
to evaluate Program Results, and none were conducted for the
purpose of Financial and Compliance evaluation.
It is important to note that the "Economy and
Efficiency" audits not only evaluate the efficiency and
effectiveness of a program but also the activity's
compliance with program objectives. This point is
emphasized since "Financial and Compliance" audits are only
concerned with compliance with laws and regulations that may
have a material effect upon the "financial statements." The
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name may tend to imply Financial and Compliance audits are
concerned with all aspects of compliance rather than those
that are just financial. This explains the lack of
Financial and Compliance audits among the 2 selected
audits.
As mentioned in Chapter II the activities audited were
grouped in to seven categories to facilitate the
presentation of this thesis. As a reminder the categories
were: ASO, SPCC, HQ/SYSCOM, NSC/NADEP, other Navy, SERVPROs
and contractors, and other Services and DLA. Table II shows
the selected audits, activities audited, the agency
performing the audit, the type of audit, and the agency
requesting the audit. This information will be used in the
analysis of the impact of BOSS audits in the next chapter.
All audits presented at least one finding and in the
majority of cases, several findings were presented. The
following is an excerpt from the Standards for Audit of
Governmental Organizations. Program. Activities. and
Functions on the definition of audit finding.
Finding/results - The result of information development;
a logical pulling together of information and arriving
at conclusions on the basis of the sum of the
information about an organization, program, activity,
function, condition, or other matter which was analyzed
or evaluated and considered to be of interest, concern,
or use to the entity. It need not be critical or be
concerned only with deficiencies or weaknesses. Purely
informational findings need not include conclusions. A
finding could be the basis for action by the entity, but
a recommendation is not part of a finding. [Ref. 20 :p.
66]
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In reviewing the findings in the selected audits it
became apparent that they would have to be classified and
categorized to effectively evaluate them. This researcher
classified the audit findings into nine categories based on
the findings of these audits. That is to say that audit
categories, although general in nature, are not generic to
all Government audits. These categories have been
specifically tailored to meet the requirements of evaluating
these 20 Audits. The findings were arranged into the
following nine categories:
- Program or procedures are inefficient, uneconomical,
and/or ineffective.
- Program or procedure is efficient, economical, and/or
effective.
- Program or procedure is not in compliance with laws,
regulations, and/or instructions.
- Program or procedure is in compliance with laws,
regulations, and/or instructions.
- Program or procedure has deficiencies, lack of guidance,
or insufficient instruction or regulation.
- Progress is being made in program or activity.
- Excess prices were paid by the Government.
- Fair and reasonable prices were paid by the Government.
- Other findings (not in any category above)
.
One other important note about the findings concerns
their extraction from the audit data. Some audits' findings
were rigidly formatted and specifically listed as audit
findings. These findings were easily recognized and
extracted from the reports. Other audits' results were of
letter form and did not specifically list their findings
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(i.e., numbered each finding), but rather generalized them
in the body of the letter. These were of greater difficulty
to extract from the audit reports, and are subject to some
discretion on the part of this researcher. For example,
this researcher may have identified a statement as a single
audit finding while another may have segregated it into two
audit findings. However, it is doubtful that this fact will
present any material problems that would sway the final
results of this study.
An area that is closely related to audit findings are
the audit objectives. Prior to beginning an audit the
Standards of Governmental Organizations, Programs.
Activities, and Functions requires the auditing activity to
develop an audit program. An audit program lists detailed
steps and procedures that are to be followed during the
course of an audit. The audit program contains such
information as the scope of the audit5 , background
information, and the audit objectives. The audit objectives
were not classified and compared as done with the audit
findings. This would have simply duplicated the information
contained within the findings. The audit objectives were
also considered to have a negligible impact on the BOSS
program. The audit objectives are merely the plan of action
5Scope of an audit is defined as a section in the audit
report that indicates the type of audit performed; the
extent of the audit; and the specific organizations,
programs, activities, and functions covered. [Ref. 20 :p.
71]
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for the audit, not the resulting findings and conclusions.
Table III is a presentation of the results of the findings.
The last category of information this researcher
reviewed was the audit recommendations. Recommendations are
not always required and some audits are only informational
in design. The goal of this audit is to present the
condition in a logical manner rather than determine what is
right or wrong. The following is a definition of audit
recommendations from the Standards for Audit of Governmental
Organizations, Programs. Activities, and Functions.
Audit recommendations—The auditor's recommendations in
the audit report are for actions to improve problem
areas noted in the audit and to improve operations.
[Ref. 20:p. 71]
This researcher found the same problem with
recommendations as with findings. The recommendations had
to be classified and categorized to facilitate evaluation.
Again, as in the case of the findings, some audit
recommendations were easily extracted from the audits since
they were readily identified (i.e., numbered
recommendations) . Still others were dispersed throughout
the audit report letter and had to be compiled. Again, as
with the findings, recommendations in these cases were
subject to the discretion of the researcher. As with the
audit findings, there will be no significant impact on the
final conclusions of this thesis.
The recommendations were classified into eight
categories and, as in the case of the findings, were
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categorized specifically for the purpose of evaluating
information contained within selected audits. These
recommendation categories are not generic to all audits;
they were specifically designed for the 20 audits reviewed.
The recommendations were broken down into the following
eight categories:
- Provide funding, resources (i.e., material, personnel),
and/or authority to program or agency/department.
- Comply with existing instruction (s) , regulation (s) , or
law(s)
.
- Develop/Implement a program, procedure, guideline, or
instruction.
- Assess or conduct further study on condition, program,
or review or monitor a situation
.
- Discontinue program, procedure, or action.
- Seek refund of support refund policy.
- Standardize/Consolidate program, procedure, or
instruction.
- Take other specific action (not specified above)
.
Table IV, on the next page, presents the recommendation
information in tabular form.
E. SUMMARY
When the BOSS program was implemented in 1983 its three
basic principles were; competition, breakout, and fair and
reasonable prices. To support those principles, 112
initiatives were drafted as a means of accomplishing those
principles. Those 112 initiatives were also classified into
ten different categories; Requirements Determination (RD)
,
Breakout (B) , Competition (C) , Method of Procurement (MP)
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Pricing (P) , Price Surveillance (PS) , Contract Management
(CM) , Training (T) , Automated Systems (AS) , and Resources
(R).
Since the beginning of BOSS an additional 15 initiatives
were added to the original 112. The Breakout category
received six additional initiatives, Competition received
three, Pricing and Price Surveillance received two each, and
Contract Management and Requirements Determination each
received one additional initiative.
Each year BOSS has reported tremendous strides in the
accomplishment of its yearly goals. To date, the BOSS
program has generated $1.3 billion in cumulative cost
avoidance. As of the conclusion of FY 1987, the Navy was
now competing 55.3 percent of its procurement dollars. The
Breakout program has now reached its steady state level of
23,000 annual full screen breakout reviews and the Pricing
Hotline now receives more that 10,000 price challenges a
year.
Secretary Weinberger's ninth initiative (from the
original 10 initiatives) called for continued audits and
investigations of spare parts pricing. GAO, DoDIG, and the
Naval Audit Service were tasked to carry out these audits
and present findings and recommendations. The activities
that were audited were arranged into seven categories: ASO,
SPCC, HQ/SYSCOM, NSC/NAD, other Navy, SERVPRO/contractors,
and other Services and DLA. The audits that were selected
for review in this thesis were all audits that had been
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completed and listed in the BOSS annual reports and any
audit listed as on-going in the FY 87 annual report and had
been completed (in draft form) as of 31 January 1988. There
were 2 audits in all that were reviewed.
The auditing agencies are all subject to the procedures
provided by the Standards for Audit of Governmental
Organizations. Programs. Activities, and Functions . These
standards provide for three types of audits; Financial and
Compliance, Economy and Efficiency, and Program Results.
All of the 2Cb audits had Economy and Efficiency audit
requirements, seven of 20 audits evaluated Program Results,
and none were of the Financial and Compliance type. It
should be noted that more than one "type of audit" can be
combined into an audit or investigation of an activity.
The audit findings were broken down into nine
classifications to facilitate the evaluation of the audit
findings. The recommendations were broken down into eight
categories for the same reason. It is emphasized that these
findings and recommendations categories were developed
specifically for this thesis and are not generic to all
audit findings and recommendations.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION
A. BOSS GOALS AND INITIATIVES
As previously discussed in Chapter II, the three
interdependent goals of the BOSS program are: breakout,
competition, and obtaining fair and reasonable prices.
These goals have not changed since the inception of the
program. Chapter II also listed the BOSS goals and
supporting initiatives. These initiatives can be thought of
as objectives to meet these goals. After all, it would be
extremely difficult to actively pursue a project as complex
as BOSS with only conceptual goals, and no tangible
objectives to obtain. The outcome of the program would also
be difficult to measure without objectives relating to
program goals.
The initiatives, unlike goals, did experience change as
the BOSS program matured. The ten basic categories of
topics (RD, B, C, etc.) discussed in Chapter III remained
unchanged (i.e., whole categories were neither added to or
deleted from) . However, six categories did experience
additions or deletions to their respective initiatives. The
BOSS program added 15 initiatives and cancelled five.
In reviewing the initiatives that were later added to
the program, two distinct areas emerged. These were the
Price Fighter program, and improving the relationships with
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contractors. Each of these areas were supported with three
additional initiatives. The Price Fighter program had two
initiatives in the Pricing category: increase the awareness
of the Price Fighter Mission (P-13) , and conduct a test of
Price Fighter data available to buyers (P-14) . The Price
Fighter program also had a related initiative in the Price
Surveillance category: conduct a three month pilot test of
the Pricing Hotline providing real time "Should Cost"
estimates within a responsible time frame for live buys at
NSC Norfolk, NAS Norfolk, and NAS Oceana, and assess the
value of Price Fighter interface with buying activities and
provide recommendations for permanent a program (PS-2 0)
.
The second area, improving relationships with
contractors, added three initiatives to the Competition
category. The initiatives were:
- COMNAVSUP meet with major Navy suppliers to address
spare parts pricing and cost issues (C-14)
,
- ICPs prepare a command Competition Advocates pamphlet
that includes a section on availability of projected buy
requirements. The pamphlet is to be included with local
publications on how to do business with the ICP, (C-15)
,
and
- define and establish "Model Business Relationships" with
major weapon systems manufacturers which we are
dependent on for non-standard and standard repair parts
(C-16)
.
The other nine initiatives added to the BOSS program
were of the cats and dogs variety and did not appear to
relate to more than one initiative in any one area. Some of
these initiatives were generic to the Navy, such as;
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expanding the use of ship repair contracts by the ICPs (B-
33) , and some of the initiatives would have impacts outside
of the Navy, such as; initiate a change to the existing Cost
Accounting Standards (CAS) which allows contractors to
allocate overhead and general and administrative (G&A)
burdens to spares orders, which in many instances, are
substantially disproportionate to the value added by the
contractor (CM-7)
.
B. BOSS PROJECT RESULTS
Although, it was stated in Chapter I that this thesis
did not intend to evaluate the BOSS program, it is important
to look at where it has been and where it appears to be
heading. The BOSS program has been active for four years
and now appears to be leveling out. The productivity of the
program has demonstrated a decreasing trend when measured in
terms of return on investment (ROI) 6 . In FY 1984 the BOSS
program experienced a 5.5 to 1 ROI steadily declining with
each passing fiscal year. In FY 1985 the ROI was 5 to 1, in
FY 1986 ROI was 4.3 to 1, and in FY 1987 the ROI was 3 . 1 to
1. Although, ROI for each fiscal year has been substantial,
even though declining, it appears that BOSS is rapidly
approaching a plateau.
6ROI is calculated by taking the total cost avoidance
for each fiscal year and dividing it by the total
investment. These figures are available in Table I.
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Another indication of the BOSS program's maturity is the
steady decline of BOSS'S most lucrative program; Breakout.
In FY 1984 the Breakout program accounted for more than 80
percent of the cost avoidance achieved by BOSS. In FY 1985
this ratio declined to 59 percent, then to 56 percent in FY
1986, and finally to 47 percent in FY 1987. It is important
to note that, although Breakout experienced a declining
share of the total cost avoidance, its monetary savings
increased each successive year with the exception of FY 1987
(see Table I)
.
The Competition and Price Fighter programs on the other
hand both provided an increased share of BOSS'S cost
avoidance as the program matured. In FY 1984 Competition
accounted for 11 percent of the BOSS total cost avoidance,
which steadily increased to 39 percent in FY 1987. The
Price Fighter program increased from less than one percent
of total cost avoidance in FY 1984 to eight percent in FY
1987. Though these programs had significant increases, they
were insufficient to offset the decreases in the Breakout
program and still maintain the 5.5 to 1 ROI experienced at
the beginning of the program. Other programs in the BOSS
project accounted for less than 10 percent of the total cost
avoidance and maintained a relatively constant percentage of
the total cost avoidance, (see Table I)
The last area that tends to indicate that the BOSS
program has reached maturity, is the attainment of 23,000
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full screen breakout reviews as a steady state level. Each
previous fiscal year BOSS had been increasing the number of
breakout reviews, but with the attainment of the steady
state, Breakout's share of the total cost avoidance should
decline even further, and no doubt augmented with a decline
in the monetary savings in FY 1988.
It should also be noted that the BOSS program did not
remain stagnant during the past four years. As can be seen
in Table I, funding for the BOSS project has increased with
each successive year. Most the growth appears to be
expansion of existing BOSS programs, however, there were
several programs that were implemented after the initiation
of the BOSS project. The Price Fighter project was started
in December of 1983 and experienced rapid expansion from
primarily ICP use to all Navy Field Contacting Activities
through the Buyer-Tech Line program.
Reverse Engineering, although not a new idea, began with
a pilot project in FY 1985 with 2 candidate items for
analysis. It tripled its program size in FY 1986 with 59
candidate items for analysis. New programs for FY 1987 were
the "Bad Apple" program and the Replenishment Part Purchase
or Borrow (RPPOB) program. The RPPOB program was initiated




Activities performing audits on BOSS programs were GAO,
DoDIG, and the Naval Audit Service. As presented earlier in
this thesis, GAO and DoDIG generally concentrated on
performing DoD-wide audits, while the Service audit agencies
concentrated on Service-related audits. Of the 2 audits
selected for review in this thesis, GAO performed nine
(45%) , DoDIG performed seven (35%) , and the Naval Audit
Service conducted four (20%) (see Table II)
.
Each audit required some type of initiation or request
to perform the audit. The requests came from one of four
general organizations: Congress, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) , the Department of the Navy
(DON), or the individual command (i.e., MCLB Albany). A
congressional request came from either an individual
congressmen or a committee (e.g., House Armed Services
Committee) . A request from OSD could either be the
Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or Assistant Secretaries.
Requests from DON could be initiated by the Secretary of the
Navy, Under Secretary, or Assistant Secretary. Individual
commands can request an internal command audit from their
respective audit agencies (e.g., Naval Audit Service for
Navy and Marine Corps commands and DoDIG for DLA) . Of the
selected audits: OSD requested eight audits, Congress
requested six audits, DON requested four of the audits, and
individual commands requested two of the audits.
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Activities audited were segregated into seven categories
to facilitate the accomplishment of this thesis: ASO, SPCC,
HQ/SYSCOMS, NSC/NADEP, other Navy, SERVPROs/contractors , and
other Services and DLA. The ICPs, HQ/SYSCOMS,
SERVPROs/contractors, and other Services and DLA were the
most heavily involved in the selected audits. ASO was
involved in ten (50%) audits, SPCC in seven (35%) audits,
HQ/SYSCOMS in eight (40%) audits, NSCs/NADEPs in one (5%)
audit, other Navy in one (5%) audit, SERVPROs/contractors in
six (30%) audits, and other Services and DLA in 11 (55%)
audits.
Of the three types of audits described in the Standards
For Audit Of Governmental Organizations. Programs.
Activities, and Functions (generally accepted Government
auditing standards) only two audits types were conducted on
the BOSS program, Economy and Efficiency and Program
Results. There were 2 (100%) Economy and Efficiency
audits, seven (35%) Program Results audits, and no
Financial and Compliance audits conducted. It should be
noted that all audits had Economy and Efficiency
requirements, while seven had additional requirements for
the evaluation of Program Results (see Table II)
.
The audit findings were grouped into nine categories as
discussed in Chapter III. Each finding in an audit was then
categorized and summarized in Table III. The results of
that summary were: 17 findings of "progress being made in
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program or procedure," 14 findings of "program/procedure was
not in compliance with laws, regulations, or directives,"
nine findings of "program has deficiency, lack of guidance,
or insufficient instruction or regulation," six findings of
"program is in compliance with laws, regulations, or
instructions," four findings of "program or procedure is
inefficient, uneconomical, ineffective," three findings of
"program is efficient, economical, effective," three
findings of "fair and reasonable prices were paid," three
findings of "other findings," and two findings of "excess
prices paid for spare parts." Notice that there are 61
findings among the 2 audits. Each audit had one to seven
findings and in some cases had mixed findings (i.e.,
positive and negative). For example, GAO audit,
Procurement: Defense Logistics Agency Implementation of
Spare Parts Initiatives (GAO/NSIAD 87-149) had one finding
of "program is in compliance with laws, regulations,
instructions," two findings of "program has deficiency, lack
of guidance, or insufficient instruction or regulation,"
three findings of "progress being made," and one finding of
"other findings." See Table III for detailed breakout of
finding. In general the findings tended to be split evenly
between positive and negative findings. There were 29
positive findings and 32 negative findings.
The audit recommendations were also categorized to
facilitate the accomplishment of this thesis. The
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recommendations were grouped into eight categories as
presented in Table IV. The selected audits produced ten
recommendations to "develop/ implement a program procedure,
guideline, or instruction": eight recommendations to
"comply with existing instructions, regulation, or law"; six
recommendations to "assess or conduct further study on
circumstance or condition" ; four recommendations to
"discontinue program, procedure, or action"; three
recommendations to "seek refunds or support refund policy";
two recommendations to "provide funding, resources, and/or
authority; two recommendations to "standardize program,
procedure, or instruction"; and two recommendations "to take
other specified actions."
The recommendations, as with findings, in many
circumstances were directed at DoD in general, and may or
may not be specifically applicable to the Navy. In all
cases the recommendations were fashioned to improve the
efficiency of the program or procedure or to comply with
regulations or instructions.
A comparison was also accomplished between the audit
findings and recommendations, and their resulting changes to
the initiatives. This was somewhat of a subjective process
since most audit findings and recommendations were written
to address specific problems during a specific period. The
initiatives on the other hand, tend to be more general in
nature and are directed at correcting conditions within the
70
Navy's procurement activities. Another problem encountered
in this analysis was the fashion in which a recommendation,
finding, and/or initiative was written. It was not always
readily apparent that a recommendation or finding was
related to a specific initiative.
The last area of concern, when comparing the initiatives
with the findings and recommendations, is the timing of the
introduction of the initiative and the publication of the
audit report. Many of the audit findings and
recommendations already had initiatives assigned to address
the discrepancy. This implies that the BOSS program already
had the problem identified, and steps were being taken to
correct the discrepancy. However, it would be important to
look at the dates initiatives were introduced, and compare
them to audit report dates.
There are actually three dates to consider when
reviewing any audit. The publication or completion date,
the period covered by the audit field work, and the
announcement of the audit.
The publication/completion date is very important
because it signifies when the audit report has been
sanctioned in its final format; the official report. The
official report may take months to compile and draft. By
the time its in the hands of the decision maker its
contents may be obsolete, especially if the audit is on a
very dynamic situation or condition.
71
A second important date is the period covered by the
audit field work. Field work can take months or even years
to complete, depending on the scope of work and the
accessibility of data. In accordance with generally
accepted Government auditing standards, auditors are
encouraged to provide interim reports, especially for
significant matters. Interim reports allow management to
start correcting a condition before the official audit
report is issued.
The last audit date to consider is the date the audit is
announced. It is common practice to program or schedule
audits to efficiently utilize the auditing staff, or to
allow the activity being audited time to prepare for the
auditors7 . When an agency or department knows a audit is
impending, it will frequently develop a plan of action (POA)
to deal with the audit. In many cases the department/agency
being audited will uncover many of the discrepancies
eventually surfaced (by the auditors) by doing a review and
attempt to make corrections before the audit starts.
In comparing the audit findings and recommendations with
the appended BOSS initiatives, only a handful of the audits
appeared to have a direct impact. The audit that seemed to
have the most significant impact was; Contracting Officer's
7To efficiently use its audit staff the auditing agency
may request that the audited agency prepare special reports
or gather specific data. This is to ensure that the
auditor's time is used effectively in auditing rather than
spending a lot of time looking for information.
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Explanation for Price Increases on 125 Spare Parts
(GAO/NSIAD 85-119^ . This audit brought out two major
findings, although there were several minor findings, that
induced a response by the BOSS program.
The first major finding was that Government buyers were
reluctant to spend time on price analysis because of
management's emphasis on awarding greater numbers of
contracts. Although the BOSS program already had
initiatives to improve the work force through training and
incentives, three additional initiatives were added in
September of 1985. They were: increase the awareness of
the Price Fighter mission (P-13) , conduct a test of Price
Fighter data available to buyers (P-14) , and conduct a test
of Hotline's ability to provide "Should Cost" estimates
within a responsible time frame for live buys at NSC
Norfolk, NAS Norfolk, and NAS Oceana. All three of the
initiatives were designed to ensure that buyers have access
to and use of information available through Price Fighter to
make quality buys.
The second finding involved the way overhead and G&A
burdens were allocated. According to the finding, CAS 418
(Allocation of Direct and Indirect Costs) allowed burden
rates to be disproportionate. In some instances these
8 GAO/NSIAD 85-119 audit did not provide any
recommendations and only presented the findings from the
interview of contracting officers and buyers.
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disproportionate rates were distributed to spare parts
orders. BOSS initiative CM-7 called for a change to the CAS
standard since it allowed substantially disproportionate
burdens to be added by the contractor.
Another significant audit finding spawning a new
initiative involved; Follow-up Audit: Procurement of Spare
Parts (Naval Audit Service T28165) . That finding stated:
of 258 sample buys, 50 (19%) were unreasonably priced due to
insufficient information about sources of supply (e.g.,
items were purchased from the prime contractor vice the
original equipment manufacturer since no other source of
supply was listed) . The initiative was a proposal to change
MILSTD 129 to include marking of unit packages with actual
manufacturer's FSCM and part number (B-34)
.
As noted earlier, several of the appended initiatives
appeared several months prior to audit findings and
recommendations, and it is impossible to tell whether they
were initiated independent of the audit. For example, the
September 1987 Audit of Vendor Technical Qualifications for
Aircraft Engine Spare Parts Procured by the Navy ASO (DoD
6AP-810. an interim report) , found that vendors did not have
adequate guidance from ASO. The BOSS program had initiated
(FY 1986) an initiative to have ICPs prepare a Competition
Advocate pamphlet that included a section on availability of
projected buy requirements. The pamphlet is to be included
with local publications on how to do business with the ICP.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The audits did not appear to have a significant effect
on the development (direction) of the BOSS program. The
definition of significant effect is open to interpretation.
There is no doubt that the selected audits had some effect
on the BOSS program. For the purposes of this study an
effect would be considered significant if one or more of the
following events occurred:
- a change in the principal goals occurred by either an
addition, deletion, or major alteration of an existing
goals,
- a change in the initiative categories occurred by either
an addition or deletion of an initiative category, or a
major adjustment to initiatives within a category, or
- an addition or deletion of a major program element
within the BOSS project.
As this study indicated there were no changes to the
BOSS program goals. Although 15 initiatives were added and
5 were cancelled, there was not a significant change to the
initiative categories, despite some initiative changes
within initiative categories. In the area of programs
within the BOSS project, nothing new has been added with the
exception of the Price Fighter program. However, the Price
Fighter program was implemented in December of 1983, less
than four months after the inception of BOSS, so it is
considered to have been part of the original BOSS program.
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The audits have in fact helped to support and reenforce
the BOSS program . Although audits are generally considered
to be a distraction, especially by those being audited, it
appears that the BOSS program has generally benefitted from
the audits. The most numerous finding, when all audits are
considered, was that "progress was being made." No doubt
that positive findings such as these help to ensure
continued growth and expansion of the program. They also
tend to lessen congressional involvement.
The BOSS program has demonstrated definitive stability
since its implementation in FY 1983 through FY 1987 . The
BOSS program has demonstrated amazing stability throughout
its life. This can be seen by continuous funding increases
and program growth (see Table I) , and the lack of
significant changes in its goals and programs.
The BOSS program was solidly established hence it has
been an unusually stable program . By the virtue of its
continued stability, the BOSS program had to have been
extremely well organized. The primary endorsement for this
conclusion, is again its stability and growth since 1983.
Only recently has this changed. FY 1988 funding reductions
have already occurred and further cuts are projected for FY
1989.
Only two of the 20 selected audits directly added to
program growth . These were the only audits to be traced
directly to the introduction of new initiatives; Contracting
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Officer's Explanations for Price Increases on 125 Spare
Parts (GAO/NSIAD 85-119^ and Follow-up Audit: Procurement
of Spare Parts (Naval Audit Service T28165) . This is not to
say that other initiatives did not have their roots in other
audits. As previously explained, due to the manner in which
findings and recommendations were written, and the timing of
the introduction of audits and initiatives, it is highly
possible that some of the initiatives, were in fact, derived
from other audits. Along this same line, there is no doubt
that the BOSS program recognizes some of its own weaknesses
and initiated actions before audits had surfaced them
formally.
Current audit trends are aimed specifically at
compliance with regulations governing spare parts
procurement . Recent trends indicate that BOSS related
audits are inclined more and more toward compliance with
regulations and accepted methods of managing spare parts.
For example, the last three audits reviewed, (see Appendix
D) were the direct result of Hotline inquiries and were
concerned with regulation compliance.
The BOSS program is rapidly reaching a plateau or its
point of equilibrium . The BOSS program has been
experiencing a steady decline in its productivity when
measured in terms of ROI. BOSS'S ROI has declined from 5.5
to one in FY 1984 to 3.1 to one in FY 1987. This decline,
coupled with the increasing emphasis on institutionalizing
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the program within the fabric of procurement, unequivocally
illustrates BOSS'S ultimate termination as a program.
The U.S. Congress no longer appears to have a direct
interest in spare parts pricing issues . Although this is a
rather conspicuous conclusion, it does support the fact that
there has been a tremendous improvement in the way the
Military procures its spare parts.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Incorporate any further audits into the regular
Procurement Management Reviews (PMR) . Only one
recommendation appears to be relevant to BOSS and that is to
incorporate some aspect of future audits into the PMRs.
Specifically, anything to do with procurement processing
should be audited by PMR teams and auditors . BOSS is a
mature program with established goals, objectives, and
methods. Therefore, compliance with present rules,
regulations and processes would lend itself well to the PMR
process. The primary reason for this recommendation is
that recent audits have tended to move away from evaluating,
if a "new" program is achieving results, to whether it is
following established procedures. Since PMRs are primarily
concerned with program compliance issues, it seems to fall
within their domain.
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C. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
a. What impact have the various audit agencies
(GAO, DoDIG, and Naval Audit Service) had on the
development of BOSS program?
Agency audits have had an effect on the program,
but are considered to be insignificant in directing changes
for improving the program. The primary reason for this
conclusion is that BOSS was well defined, organized and
executed. The vast majority of audit findings were already
being acted on by the BOSS program office before they were






a. How do the audit agencies compare regarding
audit findings, discrepancies, and
recommendations?
In general the auditing agencies appear to be
consistent in their findings and recommendations. As stated
earlier, the findings tended to be evenly split between
positive and negative findings. All audit agencies
recognized that progress had been made in the area of spare
parts procurement, and of course, all audit agencies
recognized common deficiencies. Most of the findings and
recommendations were concurred with by the agencies being
audited. The findings and recommendations that were the
not concurred with, tended to be centered around whether
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"enough" was being done to correct a situation, rather than
if a deficient condition existed.
There did not appear to be a significant amount
of duplication of effort in the 2 audits examined.
However, none of the audits followed a formal schedule or
plan (with the possible exception of Follow-up audits) and
were directed at areas thought to contain inefficiencies by
the organizations requesting the audit (i.e., Congress,
SECDEF, SECNAV) . This thesis did not have sufficient
visibility of every audit conducted on the BOSS program
(e.g., field purchasing activities) to make a determination
if excessive audit duplication occurred.
b. Have the audit agencies recommendations been
congruous with the goals and objectives of the
Navy and DoD toward procurement?
In general the auditing agencies recommendations
have supported the objectives and goals of the BOSS program.
As noted in the conclusion section of this thesis, the most
significant finding in most of the audits was that,
"progress was being made" in the procurement of spare parts.
Audits did not appear to hamper the BOSS program by
introducing recommendations that were contrary to
initiatives already underway. The goals and objectives of
the auditing agencies and those agencies audited did not
conflict.
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c. Have the audit agencies recommendations
furthered Buy Our Spares Smart's progress toward
improving spare parts pricing and to what
extent?
The same basic answer from the previous research
question (No. 2) holds true for this question. The audits
have tended to support the goals and objectives of the BOSS
program, and of the DoD initiatives in general.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
No areas of further research are recommended in the area




SECRETARY OF DEFENSE INITIATIVES
TEN POINTS (FROM MEMO OF 25 JUL 83)
1. SECDEF Initiative: Offer incentives to increase
competitive bidding and reward employees who vigorously
pursue cost savings.
2. SECDEF Initiative: Take stern disciplinary action
against those employees who are negligent in
implementing our procedures.
3. SECDEF Initiative: Alert defense contractors to the
seriousness of the problem and our firm intention to
deep prices under control
.
4. SECDEF Initiative: Ensure that competition advocates
challenge orders that are not made competitively or
appear to be excessively priced.
5. SECDEF Initiative: Refuse to pay unjustified price
increases.
6. SECDEF Initiative: Accelerate reform of basic contract
procedures.
7. SECDEF Initiative: Take steps to obtain refunds in
instances where we have been overcharged.
8. SECDEF Initiative: Cease doing business with those
contractors who are guilty of unjustified and excessive
pricing and who refuse to refund any improper
overcharges
.
9. SECDEF Initiative: Continue audits and investigations.
10. SECDEF Initiative: Eliminate excessive pricing, recover
unjustified payments and take corrective action against
those contractors and employees who are either negligent
in performing their duties or are engaging in excessive
pricing practices.
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ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES (FROM MEMO OF 29 AUG 83)
11. SECDEF Initiative: Provide resources to induce
desirable breakout, effective competitive procurement
and improved pricing in the acquisition of spare parts.
12. SECDEF Initiative: Apply the DOD Parts Program to
enhance competition.
13. SECDEF Initiative: Accelerate plans for acquisition of
computer hardware and software to assist parts control
personnel.
14. SECDEF Initiative: Institute action to identify
disparities in spare parts prices within and among
various procuring activities.
15. SECDEF Initiative: Employ value engineering to
investigate parts where cost or price exceeds intrinsic
value.
16. SECDEF Initiative: Assign more engineering resources
to review new procurement data packages for accuracy.
17. SECDEF Initiative: Develop and test a procedure to
make breakout of parts a factor in source selection for
new major systems. Develop new incentive arrangements
to reward contractors for cost savings generated by
their efforts.
18. SECDEF Initiative: Negotiate contract data provisions
which, as appropriate, reduce contractors' proprietary
rights in data.
19. SECDEF Initiative: Designate acquisition of spare
parts and reprocurement data as an agenda item in
Acquisition Strategy Panels, Advance Acquisition Plans,
and Acquisition Review Councils and Logistic Review
Group sessions.
20. SECDEF Initiative: Revise performance evaluation
factors for acquisition and logistics managers.
Include emphasis on spare parts pricing, breakout,
competition and value engineering accomplishments.
21. SECDEF Initiative: Implement DAR Supplement No. 6.
22. SECDEF Initiative: Consider in all contracts, as
appropriate the government's right and ability to
breakout and procure competitively spare parts.
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23. SECDEF Initiative: Discourage use of government
specifications and contractor proposed engineering
designs that inhibit subsequent competitive procurement
of spare parts.
24. SECDEF Initiative: Continue action on SECDEF Ten Point
Program to ensure that prices paid for all spare parts
are fair and reasonable.
25. SECDEF Initiative: Pursue appropriate refunds or other
recoupments vigorously following any audit or other
disclosure of incorrect pricing or overcharge.
26. SECDEF Initiative: Review existing contracts to fully
address any and all opportunities for improved pricing
of spare parts, including breakout and competition.
27. SECDEF Initiative: Instruct acquisition personnel to
challenge any procurement action for spare parts where
the estimated or negotiated price appears unrelated to
intrinsic value.
28. SECDEF Initiative: Reexamine existing policy on patent
and data rights arising under government funded IR&D.
29. SECDEF Initiative: Expand training curricula to ensure
emphasis, understanding and technical skill level for
all personnel engaged in the acquisition of spare
parts.
30. SECDEF Initiative: Assign special task forces to
review existing reprocurement data packages for spare
parts with high annual buy values.
31. SECDEF Initiative: Evaluate and make recommendations
for changes to existing authorization, appropriation,
apportionment, budgeting and financial management
practices and regulations pertaining to acquisition of
spares.
32. SECDEF Initiative: Pursue with appropriate
congressional committees and their staffs the merit of
two-year authorization of replenishment spare parts and
consumables.
33. SECDEF Initiative: Insist on contract terms and
conditions in all future acquisitions that afford more
equitable treatment and provide for greater assurance
of fair and reasonable prices.
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34. SECDEF Initiative: Automate data repositories to
improved the acquisition, storage, update and retrieval
of reprocurement technical data.
35. SECDEF Initiative: Evaluate and assess accomplishments





SUMMARY OF BOSS INITIATIVES
RD - Requirements Determination PS - Price Surveillance
B - Breakout CM - Contract Management
C - Competition T - Training
MP - Method of Procurement AS - Automated Systems
P - Pricing R - Resources
REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION (RD)
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-001/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Review procurement and provisioning policies to
ensure that common use items are not automatically included
in contractor interim and life cycle maintenance/supply
support packages.
GOAL : Provide field activities with a summary of applicable
existing references or, if no references exist , approval by
COMNAVSUP of new policy guidance for issuance to field.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Prepare point paper describing what happened at
NTEC and what changes should be made in provisioning policy
for training devices.
GOAL: To promulgate new guidance, if required, regarding
policy for provisioning training devices.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Research the EOQ issue decision rules to ascertain
how they may be applied to decrease the overall cost of
spare parts.
GOAL : Provide direction for use of EOQ/annual buys in order
to decrease the overall cost of spare parts.
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INITIATIVE NO.: RD-004/Cancelled SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION ; Definitize policy on when supply system stock must
be used to fill requirements identified by NSN, to include
new construction, commercial DOP's, interim life cycle
maintenance/supply support, and Navy supply . system support.
GOAL : Provide a summary of applicable existing references
or, if no references exist, promulgate new policy guidance
to field activities.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Work with GSA/DLA to reduce the number of AAC "L"
items bought in the field.
GOAL : Reduce the number of AAC "L" items to the lowest
practical level.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Require mandatory application of the DOD Parts
Control Program as defined by DODI 4120.19 in all weapon
system contracts.
GOAL : Issue guidance requiring the inclusion of the DOD
Parts Control Program in all acquisition POA&Ms.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-007/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Review existing policies and procedures for making
repair versus buy decision on repairable items and issue
appropriate guidance to field activities who make such
decisions.
GOAL : Ensure that decisions to buy or repair spare parts
are economically sound.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-008/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Pursue the concept of consistent fill rates/Average
Days Delay (ADD) among services as a basis for balanced
weapon system support funding.
GOAL : To evaluate whether budgeted requirements are
achieving required support for spares, and to determine what
additional resources are needed to achieve increased levels.
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INITIATIVE NO.: RD-009/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Determine the feasibility of competing spares buys
for initially competed equipment.
GOAL : To allow ICPs to make competitive buys rather than
sole source PlOs/direct procurements for spares buys.
BREAKOUT (B)
INITIATIVE NO.: B-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Implement DAR Supplement 6 and establish Breakout
Program at Inventory Control Points and Hardware Systems
Commands
.
GOAL : To ensure that the Navy implements a viable Breakout
Program in order to obtain maximum competition in the
acquisition of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Designate SES as full-time technical advocate for
breakout
GOAL : To provide, within NAVSUP, a high-level position to
ensure the successful implementation of a visible Breakout
Program
.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Establish a formal program to challenge proprietary
data restrictions on parts for existing systems.
GOAL : To challenge invalid proprietary data claims by
contractors. Where necessary, legal action will be pursued
to obtain data.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Prioritize and fund acquisition of reprocurement
technical data in ILS planning process.
GOAL : To ensure that all data required to allow maximum
competition during the reprocurement of spares is acquired
during the Integrated Logistics Support process.
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INITIATIVE NO.: B-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #3
ACTION : Establish liaison with upper level corporate
managers to sell Navy's competitive/breakout strategy.
GOAL : To involve industry-executives in supporting the
Department of Defense increased competition program.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Develop a course on spare parts breakout which is
aimed at engineers.
GOAL : To provide engineers with the knowledge necessary to
ensure the successful implementation of Navy's Breakout
Program.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-007/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Develop a policy as to when rights in data can be
limited.
GOAL : To ensure that reprocurement data is provided to the
government to the maximum extent under the law.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-008/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Develop a certification to be included in all
solicitations for spare parts requiring contractors to
indicate whether they (1) manufacture, (2) buy, (3)
assemble, or (4) test the item being sold to the government.
GOAL : Field activities will utilize certification to ensure
that the maximum level of competition is attained in the
procurement of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-009/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Develop procedures for ICPs to utilize the
information obtained as certifications in B-008 to promote
both procurement from OEMs and competition.
GOAL : To make available during the reprocurement process,
data relative to known sources of the material.
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INITIATIVE NO.: B-010/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION ; Expand the warranty clause of weapon systems
procurement packages to permit the government to charge the
contractor the costs incurred for correcting any defective
data package.
GOAL : To minimize the cost to the government of having
incomplete and inaccurate data.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-011/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Develop a clause for weapon systems contracts that
gives the government the right to forward data packages to
an independent (non-government) data review contractor to
determine validity of proprietary data restrictions.
GOAL : To ensure that the government obtains rights to all
data to which it is entitled.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-012/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Ensure acquisition Method Code (AMC) conferences
are held to the maximum extent possible and as early as
practicable. Breakout benefits in terms of numbers
reviewed, codes assigned , estimated annual dollar demand and
other pertinent data are to be reported on a monthly basis.
GOAL : To achieve the maximum extent of competition in
future reprocurement actions.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-013/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Propose a change to MIL-D-1000B to restore Category
F drawings as a requirement under the MILSPEC.
GOAL : To obtain the maximum amount of technical data during
the acquisition process.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-014/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Develop a clause for weapon systems contracts
whereby contractors are required to identify the cost for
the government to acquire unlimited rights to reprocurement
technical data, and are required to identify the extent to
which they are using standard commercial products.
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GOAL : To ensure that the government has the maximum amount
of technical data and other information in order to
increase the level of competition during the reprocurement
of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-015/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Develop a clause for weapon systems contracts
requiring contractors to identify the OEM and the OEM part
numbers of purchase parts.
GOAL : To increase to the maximum extent, competition in the
procurement of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-016/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Provide three technical data packages that are
noncompetitive due to proprietary legends
—
packages to be
forwarded to ASN (S&L)
.
GOAL : To provide ASN (S&L) with examples of the problems
encountered in obtaining data rights.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-017/Cancelled SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Develop and test a procedure to make breakout of
spare parts a factor in source selection for major systems.
Develop incentive arrangements to reward contractors for
cost savings generated by their efforts.
GOAL : To obtain the lowest possible price for spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-018/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Develop contract data provisions which, as
appropriate, reduce contractors' proprietary rights in data.
GOAL : To increase the amount of technical data available to
the government.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-019/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Establish a management information system to track
the success of the conversion from contractor recommended
procurement codes to fully competitive procurement status so
that the benefits of the program are established versus the
cost to administer it.
GOAL : To quantify the benefits of the Breakout Program.
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INITIATIVE NO.: B-020/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION ; Research contractor licensing arrangement (such as
that between Sikorsky and Agusta) of top 2 contractors.
GOAL : To identify licensing arrangements which can be
utilized for direct procurement from the OEM.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-021/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Develop a contractual provision permitting deferred
ordering of engineering data that required contractor
maintenance of engineering data through post production.
GOAL : To ensure that current technical data is available
from the contractor for reprocurement
.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-022/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Ensure an increase in, and monitor the number of
items that are AMC coded.
GOAL: To promote competition.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-023/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Develop policy document for ICPs/HSCs defining
requirement for obtaining technical data and Level II/III
drawings for new weapon system acquisitions.
GOAL : To provide definitive guidance to ICPs and HSCs
relative to obtaining technical data and Level II/III
drawings
.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-024/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Include the acquisition of reprocurement data as
part of modification management.
GOAL : To ensure that data is acquired on spares for systems
requiring modification.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-025/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Ensure that all data files related to technical
support and procurement of spares contain accurate and up-
to-date information.
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GOAL : To facilitate competition in the reprocurement of
spares.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-02 6/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Establish procedures to request ACOs to provide
lists of Navy managed items that contractors purchase
complete from subcontractors and to screen these items for
purchase breakout to the subcontractor.
GOAL : To expand the possible sources of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-027/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Periodically request lists of purchase-completed
items and maintain records of breakout reviews of these
items
.
GOAL : To expand competition.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-028/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Instruct personnel responsible for technical
reviews of item purchases in the need for effective
examination of drawings or other data in limited-screening
purchase breakout efforts.
GOAL : To ensure that adequate review of technical data is
performed.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-029/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Develop a supply bailment policy to govern
agreements whereby commercial activities can borrow parts of
components from the ICPs inventories for the purpose of
design replication, development of reprocurement data
packages and subsequent offer to supply same.
GOAL : To define NAVSUP bailment policy and issue guidance.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-030/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Develop and implement a management plan to evaluate
and reduce unnecessary contract specifications and
acquisition requirements.
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GOAL : To eliminate unnecessary contract specifications and
acquisition requirements.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-031/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Implement a reverse engineering program to obtain
reprocurement technical data packages suitable for
competition.
GOAL : To use reverse engineering, when feasible, to develop
technical data packages suitable for competition when
otherwise sole source procurement is necessary.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-032/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Define the policy for application of warranties to
secondary items, and issue NAVSUPINST on warranty policy.
GOAL : To define NAVSUP warranty and issue guidance.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-033/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: In the area of repairables, pursue the possibility
of expanding ICP use of ship repair contractors who are
working for SUPSHIPS and Type Commanders into the ICP repair
base.
GOAL : To increase the competitive base and assure fir and
reasonable costs are incurred in repair contracts.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-034/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Propose changes to MIL-STD 129 to include marking
of unit packages with actual manufacturers FSCM and Part
Number
.
GOAL : To aid in breakout to OEM by requiring identification
when a spare part is procured from a manufacturer other than
the design activity.
COMPETITION (C)
INITIATIVE NO.: C-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Establish FY84 competition goals for major field
procurement activities.
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GOAL : To increase the number of procurements made on a
competitive basis.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #1&3
ACTION : Issue FLASH from COMNAVSUP on competition.
GOAL : To make field activities aware of the importance of,
and level of attention being given to, efforts to increase
competition.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Review competitive procurement for Interim Support
Item List (ISILs)
.
GOAL : To provide an explanation of the ISIL concept and
explore the pros/cons of competitive procurement for ISILs.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Strengthen the process for inspection and
acceptance of technical data by cognizant
engineers/technicians. Require engineers/technicians to
validate with recognizable annotation that they were
reviewed for adequacy and completeness.
GOAL : To ensure that the advantages of competition are
fully exploited by having adequate technical information
available.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Publish a system listing of sole source items
broken out to competition for use by all field contracting
activities.
GOAL : To provide field contracting activities with the
information to increase the level of competitive
procurements
.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #1
ACTION: Provide guidance to field activities on
incorporation of competition/pricing goals into Merit Pay




GOAL : To bring the importance of the competition/spares
pricing to the individual employee level.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-007/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS : #4
ACTION : Appoint Competition Advocates at all activities
with $25,000 authority and establish a "Competition Advocate
of the Quarter" award program.
GOAL : To establish a focal point for all efforts related to
increasing competition and improving spares pricing, and to
officially recognize those individuals who have made a
significant contribution to those efforts.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-008/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Conduct test of adding applicable MILSPEC/MILSTD
numbers and method of fabrication information to Commerce
Business Daily announcements.
GOAL : To increase to number of potential sources for
procuring spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-009/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS:
ACTION : Develop in-house operating procedures whereby the
Competition Advocate is informed of all unsolicited
proposals for sole source items so that identified source of
supply is considered on future procurement.
GOAL : To expand the possible sources from which to procure
spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-010/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #1
ACTION : Revise position descriptions and establish new
critical elements and performance standards to motivate
employees to reduce costs and increase competition.
GOAL : To bring the importance of competition/spares to the
individual employee level.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-011/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #8
ACTION : Develop and promulgate uniform guidance for
approval of alternate manufacturing sources for items with
restrictive acquisition method codes.
GOAL : To identify additional manufacturing sources.
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INITIATIVE NO.: C-012/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Initiate action to improve the response time in
which Navy Engineering support Activities (ESAs) respond to
requests for technical data from DLA Inventory Control
Points.
GOAL : To ensure that the ICP managing the item has
sufficient information to promote competition and to procure
the correct item.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-013/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #3
ACTION : Develop and implement procedures to review
Acquisition Plans (AOs) and business clearances for an
adequate "Spare Parts Annex" section.
GOAL : To assess the adequacy of provisions for acquiring
technical documentation for spares competition/breakout.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-014/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #8
ACTION : COMNAVSUP meet with major Navy suppliers to address
spares pricing and cost issues.
GOAL : To interface with industry in the area of increasing
competition and fair pricing.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-015/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #3&6
ACTION : ICPs prepare a Command Competition Advocate
Pamphlet that includes a section on availability of
projected buy requirements listing. Pamphlet to be
included with local publications on how to do business with
the ICP, "Selling to the Military", and for pick-up.
GOAL : Advertise availability of projected buy listings to
support generating second sources and competition.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-016/Cancelled SECDEF 10 PTS: #8
ACTION : Define and establish "Model Business Relationships"
with major weapons systems manufacturing which we are
dependent on for nonstandard/standard repair parts.
GOAL : To establish better relationships with companies such
as Grumman.
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INITIATIVE NO.: C-017/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #8
ACTION : To develop a publication and distribute a
competition hit list similar to what DLA has.
GOAL : Catalog of pictured items with only one supplier.
METHOD OF PROCUREMENT (MP)
INITIATIVE NO.: MP-=001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Continue action under the Spare Acquisition
Integrated with Production (SAIP) and Timely Spares
Provisioning (TSP) programs.
GOAL : To reduce the overall cost of procuring spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: MP-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Exploit combined purchased for Navy/Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) customers.
GOAL : To reduce the cost of producing spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: MP-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Centralize procurement of fleet unit non-standard
CASREP requisitions at SPCC.
GOAL : To reduce the overall cost of procuring these spare
parts and to provide more responsive service to fleet
customers
.
INITIATIVE NO.: MP-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Review the use of unpriced orders with the goal of
reducing the total number issued; assure that 98 percent of
unpriced orders are definitized within six months of issue
and 100 percent definitized within 12 months.
GOAL : To reduce the ultimate cost of spare parts.
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INITIATIVE NO.: MP-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Expand use of multi-year contracts for spares.
GOAL : To reduce the overall cost of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: MP-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Develop and establish automated bidders mailing
lists at procurement activities.
GOAL : To facilitate increased competition for spare parts.
PRICING (P)
INITIATIVE NO.: P-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Send message to DLA requesting review of pricing
techniques.
GOAL : To ensure that the lowest possible prices are being
paid for spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #9
ACTION : Send message to DCAA requesting operational audit
of Gould and determination if other contractors have pricing
techniques similar to Gould's.
GOAL : To ensure that the government is paying the lowest
reasonable price for an item.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Phase out redeterminable Basic Ordering Agreements.
GOAL : To ensure that the Navy obtains the best possible
price for an item at the time it is ordered.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Assign personnel to do value engineering review of
spare parts purchased.
GOAL : To increase the level of value engineering performed
at Navy contracting activities.
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INITIATIVE NO.: P-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Review Navy policy on reliance on DCAS to negotiate
prices and prepare a point paper summarizing results of
review and recommending policy changes as required.
GOAL : To assess the need for policy change.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Publish Field Contracting Alert concerning
allocation of overhead to spare parts.
GOAL : To advise field contracting activities to monitor
contractors' method of overhead allocation to spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-007/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Request the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey to
prepare an analysis of Navy cost to procure material.
GOAL : To ascertain the cost to procure material, including
cost for stock point to receive and issue. Cost computed
will be available for use in other analyses concerning
overall spares acquisition process.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-008/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Analyze prices of NSN material bought locally by a
stock point and develop lessons learned.
GOAL : To assess the impact relative to spare parts prices
of locally procured spares.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-009/Continuing SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Establish more realistic initial estimated prices
for spare parts and consolidate initial buy quantities of
provisioned items.
GOAL : To minimize the impact of inaccurate prices on the
material budgeting process and to ensure economies are
realized during the initial buy process.
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INITIATIVE NO.: P-010/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION ; Provide buyers with visibility of all
interchangeable part numbers within a given family group.
GOAL : To identify possible substitute items and to identify
less costly items.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-011/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Identify and attack instances where Navy is paying
interdivisional mark-up on spares.
GOAL: To reduce the cost of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-012/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Provide policy guidance to NFCS activities to
ensure that the government is charged nor more than a
vendor would charge its best customer.
GOAL : To achieve the best possible fair price.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-013/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Increase awareness of Price Fighter mission.
GOAL : To have all contracting personnel, as well as end
users, aware of the Navy Price Fighters mission, and
informed of cost cutting tips learned by the Price Fighter
Group
.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-014/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Conduct test of Price Fighter data available to
buyers on 6-10 cases selected by the ICPs.
GOAL : Determine how Price Fighter data can benefit buyers.
PRICE SURVEILLANCE (PS)
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #1-10
ACTION : Prepare ALNAV covering pricing/competition.
GOAL : To establish CNO policy in support of SECDEF 's TEN
POINT PLAN.
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INITIATIVE NO.: PS-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #5
ACTION : In conjunction with the implementation of the stock
funding of Aviation Depot Level Repairables (AVDLRs)
,
sensitize Navy users regarding the reasonableness of spare
parts prices.
GOAL : To avoid paying exorbitant prices for Navy
requirements
.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #3
ACTION : Mount proactive media coverage of positive actions
taken on pricing/competition front.
GOAL: To keep the public informed of actions taken to
improve spare parts pricing.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #1
ACTION : Recognize military and civilian employees who
achieve significant price reductions.
GOAL: Through recognition of these employees, the
importance of improved spares pricing will be brought to the
attention of all personnel.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Develop NAVSUP capability to do value analysis
(should cost analysis) of material. ' "PRICE FIGHTER"
GOAL : To identify items which are overpriced.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #5
ACTION : Establish a formal program to conduct in-depth
reviews of "out of tolerance" prices.
GOAL : To identify unwarranted increase in spare parts
prices.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-007/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #5
ACTION : Establish new Price Analysis filters in the UICP
program G02
.
GOAL : To ascertain the best parameter (s) for the program.
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INITIATIVE NO.: PS-008/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #5
ACTION ; Direct field activities to identify cases to
cognizant engineering activities where intrinsic value is
not consistent with established price.
GOAL : To provide a mechanism whereby personnel in the field
can identify questionable spare parts prices which should be
investigated.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-009/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Establish system to monitor Contract Administer
Office (CAO) pricing of BOA orders originating by the ICPs.
GOAL : To identify pricing and response time difficulties
created by CAOs
.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-010/Cancelled SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Issue quarterly report cards to Administrative
Contracting Offices (CAOs) DCAS and DLA HQ on timeliness of
pricing actions.
GOAL : To advise DCAS and DLA HQ of their performance so
that action may be taken to improve performance where
warranted.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-Oil/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Perform price comparison test of items priced
prospectively versus after award and report results.
GOAL : To ascertain impact of pricing techniques on final
price of item.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-012/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Conduct random sample of 125 items to determine if
prices paid increased or decreased.
GOAL : To ascertain recent trends in the prices of spare
parts.
103
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-013/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Conduct an analysis of 30 items on draft audit
report 3AP-021 for which prices increased by 100 percent or
more.
GOAL : To assess validity of prices.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-014/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Develop a program which will compare and display
the prices paid for locally purchased stock numbered (AAC
"L") items reported by NFCS activities.
GOAL : To provide item managers and field contracting
personnel with a tool for determining the lowest price
available.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-015/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION : Receive, review and reply to reports of excessive
pricing received from Navy customers.
GOAL : To challenge DLA and/or other Services' excessive
price increases.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-016/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #1
ACTION : Review, and refine if necessary, NACSUP's employee
recognition program.
GOAL : In view of emphasis being placed on spare parts
procurement and in support of initiative PS-004, the NACSUP
employee recognition program must be adequately implemented.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-017/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Develop criteria for evaluating the PRICE FIGHTER
program to include appropriate cost benefit analyses and
alternatives for expanding capabilities.
GOAL : To objectively evaluate the results of the pilot
PRICE FIGHTER team.
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INITIATIVE NO.: PS-018/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #5
ACTION : Develop and promulgate to the NFCS a checklist of
the minimum requirements for documentation of price
reasonableness
.
GOAL : To provide guidance to the field to assist them in
pricing.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-019/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Determine if FPI/NIB prices should be challenged
through formal procedures when the item can be bought from a
commercial source at a lower price.
GOAL : To assure fair and reasonable prices are paid for all
items
.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-020/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Conduct three month pilot test hotline providing
real time "should cost" estimates within a responsible
timeframe for live buys at the following activities: NSC
Norfolk, NAS Norfolk, NAS Oceana. Assess the value of Price
Fighter interface with buying activities and provide
recommendations for permanent program.
GOAL : To provide buyers with should cost analyses to assist
in negotiating fair and reasonable prices.
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT (CM)
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #7
ACTION : Perform in-depth review of Naval Training and
Equipment Center (NTEC) contracts.
GOAL : To recommend corrective action to NTEC contracting
procedures.
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #9
ACTION : Reduce NTEC contracting authority; provide detailed
guidance to NTEC/NSC Charleston on transfer of contracting
authority.
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GOAL : To suspend the awarding of contracts over $500K
pending resolution of NTEC contract procedure problems.
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #9
ACTION : Elevate pricing and competition to special interest
items on Contract Management Reviews. (CMRs)
.
GOAL : To ensure that pricing and competition areas are
given particular attention during CMRs.
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #7&8
ACTION: Accept refunds from contractors who have
overcharged. Recommend suspension/debarment of vendors
defrauding the government.
GOAL : To solicit refunds where deemed appropriate, and to
penalize vendors when such action is considered necessary.
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : All contracts for spare parts and repair kits of
$25 t 000 or more for other than standard commercial parts
will contain a value engineering incentive clause.
GOAL : To comply with DOD Directive 5010.8.
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #2
ACTION : Ensure all Naval Reserve Officers assigned to Navy
field Contracting System activities are briefed on standards
of conduct, particularly in regard to conflict of interest.
GOAL : To preclude any impropriety or the appearance of
impropriety which may result form Reservists performing
functions within the contracting organization.
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-007/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Initiate change to the existing Cost Accounting
Standards (CAS) which allow contractors to allocate
overhead/G&A burdens to spares orders which in many
instances are substantially disproportionate to the value
which the contractor has added.





INITIATIVE NO.: T-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #9
ACTION : Arrange for the Naval Investigative Service (NIS)
to train CMR teams, including ICP internal review teams, in
fraud detection techniques.
GOAL : To ensure that contracting personnel are aware of
ways in which to detect contractor fraudulent practices.
INITIATIVE NO.: T-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Review training/qualification criteria for
promotion in 1102/1105 series and develop new criteria as
required.
GOAL : The emphasis being placed on improving competition
and spares pricing dictates that all procurement personnel
be fully qualified before assuming more responsible
positions.
INITIATIVE NO.: T-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Mandate semi-annual cost/price analysis courses to
be held on-site at ICPs.
GOAL : To ensure that contracting personnel are aware of
most recent cost/price analysis techniques.
INITIATIVE NO.: T-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Require 1102 personnel to take refresher cost/price
analysis course every three years.
GOAL : To keep the personnel in the 1102 series current with
cost/price techniques.
INITIATIVE NO.: T-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Review requirements for issuing warrants to
Contracting Officers.




INITIATIVE NO.: AS-001/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Increase automation of procurement process.
GOAL : To increase the ability of the NAVSUP field
contracting activities to manage the procurement process
through automation.
INITIATIVE NO.: AS-002/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Conduct a review of technical data access
procedures utilized by the ICPs.
GOAL : Develop recommendation for improving the processes.
INITIATIVE NO.: AS-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Develop an automated system which will provide
buyer with on-line access to information such as MILSPECs,
price history and pictorial presentations to assist in the
declericalization of procurement.
GOAL : To reduce the clerical approach involved in
procurement and to provide buyers with required information.
INITIATIVE NO.: AS-004/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Implement Navy Print On Demand System (NPODS) at
the Naval Publications and Forms Center (NPFC)
.
GOAL : NPODS will enable NPFC to provide potential
contractors with applicable specifications and standards
more responsively and at less cost than at present.
INITIATIVE NO.: AS-005/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Convert data repository technical files supporting
ICP reprocurement to an electronic form.
GOAL : To provide buyers and item managers with technical
data in a more timely manner.
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INITIATIVE NO.: AS-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION : Implement Military Standard Contract Administration
Procedures (MILSCAP) at Navy activities.
GOAL : To enhance the Navy's efforts to improve the spare
parts acquisition process and to facilitate the transmission
and use of data between and among DOD components.
RESOURCES (R)
INITIATIVE NO.: R-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Increase resources (funds/end strength) to enhance
competition and pricing at NAVSUP procurement activities.
GOAL : To enable NAVSUP activities to buy spares more
effectively.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Provide additional resources to ASO/SPCC and
Hardware Systems Commands to increase breakout efforts.
GOAL : To enable the ICPs to achieve high levels of
competition in spares procurement.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Increase FY84/85 funding to accelerate the
implementation of the Automated Procurement and Data Entry
System (APADE) at NSCs and NRCCs.
GOAL : To declericalize the procurement process at field
activities.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Obtain FY84/85 R&D funds to automate data
repositories at NAVSUP activities; i.e., NPODS at NPFC.
GOAL : To reduce the manual workload associated with data
retrieval.
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INITIATIVE NO.: R-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Provide funds and end strength to staff a "PRICE
FIGHTER" value analysis team.
GOAL : To develop an intrinsic value analysis capability.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Provide resources to increase Value Engineering
efforts.
GOAL : To improve Value Engineering programs at Navy ICPs.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-007/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Provide funds for increased training of procurement
personnel
.
GOAL : To upgrade the expertise in spares acquisitions.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-008/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Review staffing of procurement functions at non-
NAVSUP field contracting activities.
GOAL : Identify shortfalls where they exist and pursue
additional resources where required.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-009/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION : Develop and implement a system to identify and
track the cost of, and savings attributed to the major
Project BOSS programs such as Breakout, challenges to
proprietary legends, etc.





The following is a list of the audits reviewed:
1. Review of the Management of the J-52 Aircraft Engine.
Date completed: 3 January 1985
Audit agency/number: Naval Audit Service T3 0113
2« DOD Making Progress In Identifying and Marketing
Obsolete Repair Parts.
Date completed: 21 February 1985
Audit agency/number: GAO/NSIAD 85-47
3. Aircraft Engine Spare Parts Pricing, Costing,
Negotiations and DOD Review Functions.
Date completed: 21 March 1985
Audit agency/number: DOD 85-081
4. Actions taken by DOD on GAO recommendations to Improve
Spare Parts Requirement Determinations.
Date completed: 30 April 1985
Audit agency/number: GAO/NSIAD 85-61
5. Combined Procurement Procedure Needs Provisions for
Audit Verification.
Date completed: 8 July 1985
Audit agency/number: GAO/NSIAD 85-112
6. Contracting Officers 1 Explanation for Price Increases on
12 5 Spare Parts.
Date completed: 29 July 1985
Audit agency/number: GAO/NSIAD 85-119
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7. Multilocation DOD-wide Follow-up Audit of Spare Parts
Procurement.
Date completed: 19 November 1985
Audit agency/number: Naval Audit Service T48185
8. Management of Value Engineering Change Proposals.
Date completed: 2 6 December 1985
Audit agency/number: DOD 86-050
9. Spare Parts Pricing Inappropriate Use of Rate
Agreements
.
Date completed: 13 January 1986
Audit agency/number: GAO/NSIAD 86-18
10. Procurement: Department of Defense Initiatives to
Improve the Acquisition of Spare Parts.
Date completed: 11 March 1986
Audit agency/number: GAO/NSIAD
11. Audit of Pricing Support Provided by the Defense
Contract Administration Services for Spare Parts
Procurements
.
Date completed: 2 June 1986
Audit agency/number: DOD 86-098
12. Follow-up Audit: Procurement of Spare Parts.
Date completed: 5 June 1986
Audit agency/number: Naval Audit Service T2 8165
13. Procurement: Limited Data on DOD's Parts Breakout
Program.
Date completed: 10 October 1986
Audit agency/number: GAO/NSIAD 78-16BR
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14. Procurement: Defense Logistics Agency Implementation
of the Spare Parts Initiatives.
Date completed: 1 June 1987
Audit agency/number: GAO/NSIAD 87-14 3.
15. Procurement: Navy Implementation of Spare Parts
Initiatives.
Dated completed: 1 June 1987
Audit agency/number: GAO/NSIAD 87-149
16. Quick Action Report on NSN 2915-00-922-8989, Seal
Assembly.
Date completed: 20 August 1987
Audit agency: DOD 87-225
17. Audit of Minimum Economic Order Quantities.
Date completed: 6 March 1987
Audit agency/number: DOD 6SL-023
18. Audit of Vendor Technical Qualifications for Aircraft
Engine Spare Parts Procured by the Navy ASO.




Audit of the Procurement of Crashworthy Crewseats for
Helicopters.
Date completed: 21 September 1987
Audit agency/number: DOD 6AP-810
20. Audit of Honeywell Catalog Pricing.
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